Whats Modern About Terrorism

What, if anything, is modern about terrorism?

Introduction

Terrorism in its various forms has been around for two millennia with the word “terror” entering the English language in the 1790’s during the French Revolution. In a speech, Maximilian Robespierre, the bourgeois revolutionary, addressed the new French Republic stating; "terror is nothing more than speedy, severe and inflexible justice”.

Though Robespierre was referring to state terror this could as easily have referred to non-state terrorism and non-state actors. Starting with the Anarchists in the 19th Century the scene has changed little with regard to the modern non-state terrorist; however, the development of terrorist organisations has been radically affected by an ever-changing world and the necessity for the terrorists to keep pace in order achieving their goals and objectives.

This essay will concentrate on the modern era of non state terrorism from the 19th Century Anarchists to contemporary religious groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It will discuss how modernity and developments in society, communications, technology and weaponry has motivated continuous change in the operational strategies of terrorist groups to combat counter-terrorism organisations who seek to disrupt the terrorist’s ability to convey their message to the masses.

Constant Change

Martin (2015) maintains that as a phenomenon, terrorism is constantly adjusting to the ‘new’ world environment; structures and approaches have changed as a reaction to the need to evolve to achieve their goal. “In the mud in the room, these methodologies and organisational configurations have continued to evolve. Contemporary commentators and laypersons tend to interpret modern events as though they have no historical precedent. However, terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon; in fact, it has a long history.” (Martin, 2015, p.loc.4078)

It maybe true nothing is completely new about terrorism and it is not a modern phenomenon but it is modernizing with the progression of time because of the effects of contemporary contexts and environmental influences. “Terrorism is a generalised construct derived from our concepts of morality, law, and the rules of war, whereas actual terrorists are shaped by culture, ideology, and politics specific, inchoate factors and notions that motivate diverse actions.” (Jenkins, 2006). Technology has affected many aspects of life with the greatest scientific advances taking place in the industrial revolution marking a significant period in history following the social and political revolution in France.

Lewis (2007:225) discusses the relationship between the modernization of technology and terrorism. He suggests technological progression is not discriminating in its potential uses. “Technology has provided terrorists with a continuing improvement in their weaponry, beginning with the daggers of ancient times and then guns, dynamite, and more recently, plastic explosives, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, and sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” (Lewis, 2007. pp.225)

With the industrialization of Europe in the 19th Century came innovations; mechanization, economic and social change providing opportunities for growth and prosperity for many. These advances included steam power for transport and manufacturing, new metals and advances in metallurgy, large scale production of chemicals, new and more powerful weapons and explosives, affordable roll paper for mass media and pamphlets to name a few. The contemporary terrorist’s groups realized that these new innovations in some way could be used to their advantage and help them to transmit their message and aid their campaigns. White (2013) reasons the new breed of terrorist not only utilizes modern technology in its struggle but is now dependent on certain aspects of modernity to continue the fight. History has shown the life of terrorist groups is limited; the acts of terrorism must be constantly seen and heard by its intended audience to be successful. “As one terrorist commander summarized, it is better to kill one person in front of a camera than to kill a hundred in a secret location. Terrorists need an audience.” (White, 2013). Terrorists not only require modern technology to carry out their attacks but equally to reach the widest audiences possible.

These factors coincided with the birth of the Anarchist movement in Russia in the latter half of the 19th century, which in turn produced ‘modern terrorism’. According to Sageman (2008), with the acquittal of Vera Zasulich, a Marxist and founder of the ‘Emancipation of Labour’ group, who shot and wounded Colonel Trepov in 1887, the Anarchists realized that violence attracted much media attention which in turn help to spread their propaganda much more effective, and cheaply, than pamphlets.

Therefore, the media were complicit in spreading the anarchist strategy of ‘propaganda by deed’ by giving it considerable coverage, this, in turn, had the effect of attracting dissatisfied peoples who sought a cause to campaign for.

The Anarchists movement took the decision to create more spectacular events, assassinations and bombings, to wreak increased violence in the public domain in an effort to attract additional attention to the campaign and enhance the spread of their message. In 1866 Alfred Nobel discovered a powerful, reliable and comparatively safe to handle explosive, dynamite. Dynamite brought new possibilities for the construction industries hitherto previously unthinkable and this was also true for the violent and destructive aspirations of the Anarchists. Jensen (2004:17) states that the anarchist revolution recognized that the use of dynamite, as a strategic weapon, would get them the recognition they were craving. These groups did not want their acts to be perceived as commonplace murder even if it is the murder of a prominent person, they wanted more psychological impact on their audience. They believed that using dynamite would give them this advantage and to this end the Anarchist group the People’s Will employed this new explosive during its campaign, even though a pistol would have been more accurate.

Dynamite gave the anarchists opportunities for spectacular targeted assassination attacks and the ability to damage and destroy property. The attempt and eventual success, at creating mass casualties would come much later in the evolution of terrorism as modern terrorist organizations are forever battling to keep their message in the minds of governments and the public. Simon (2011) suggests that these groups feel they must use asymmetric tactics and evermore violent acts to get a reaction and stop the audience from becoming desensitized to the message.

Escalation in Violence

The use of ever more violent and outrageous strategies has been on the rise in the new millennium. With the advent of 9/11, the United States government declared a ‘war on Terrorism’ and more recently after the Paris attacks, the French Prime Minister, Hollande, declared that the attacks were a declaration of war by the terrorists. Both of these events, and video’s of hostage beheadings, shocked the world and stimulated world governments and the general public into action after they have appeared to have become desensitized to the ‘traditional’ terrorist methods of car bombings, assassinations and kidnappings.

Lewis (2007) discusses how a trend of escalating violence has developed. He suggests the modernization of ‘weapons systems’ has developed into ‘liveware’, the human element we have seen in the recent attacks. He describes the dynamic interaction between the humans and technology, the suicide bombers acting as the switch, 7/7, and terrorists that act as the guidance systems of weapons, 9/11, asymmetric methods, modern technology.

In the 1990’s Laqueur declared there had been a major seed change to the targeting aims of terrorists. He saw the violence was becoming indiscriminate and “the world was now confronted with terrorists whose aim was ‘to liquidate all satanic forces [and destroy] all life on earth”. (Neumann, 2009). Laqueur’s observations were exemplified in the successful attacks of 9/11, the attack on the World Trade Center in the US, in addition, there have been other attempts and unfortunately successes but not on the scale of 9/11. This was not the first attempt at a mass attack; in the early 1990’s, there was a plan to target the World Trade Center by a cell, led by Islamist extremist Ramzi Yousef and they intended to kill thousands. This attempt was shadowed sometime later by an attack on the underground, in Japan, by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Here the group released a poisonous gas, sarin, in an attempt to indiscriminately kill as many people as possible. There were few deaths though casualties numbered in the hundreds, not quite the results they desired. Just one month later the bombing of Oklahoma City offices by an alleged lone bomber, Timothy McVeigh, succeeded in killing 168 people. (Neumann, 2009)

As this proved, traditional methods of attack, as used by McVeigh, proved to be more successful than the attempts to develop and use Weapons of Mass Destruction, as in the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the underground, planning, technology, expertise and execution need to be at the highest level to achieve these aims. The 9/11 attack was, at the time, though unlikely if not impossible because it was ‘unthinkable’. This is where the modern terrorist employed asymmetric tactics to carry out its attacks at the heart of America. Jenkins (2006) argues, that although many terrorist groups and cells have the capability to carry out such attacks, they do not. There is evidence of Jihadists discussions as to the effectiveness and appropriateness of indiscriminate and mass killings in the pursuit of their goal, some arguing that this strategy is damaging to the cause. “Overall, though, jihadists seem ready to murder millions, if necessary. Many of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead”. (Jenkins, 2006)

Weapons of Mass Destruction

It would therefore seem logical that the modern weapons of choice will be Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD. Fortunately, so far, this weapons technology has proved unobtainable or beyond the practical scientific capabilities of the terrorist.

Matusitz (2013) considers that attempts and successful mass-casualty attacks since the 1990’s have been on the rise with the driver being the modernization of the media, globalization, technological advancements and public perceptions. It would appear Weapons of Mass Destruction, or their components, are available for procurement or development but not used. There could be numerous reasons for this situation including the absence of enough funds, as the cost of purchase would be high, and expertise, very specialist knowledge is required to design, build and successfully apply such devices.

Matusitz (2013) further questions whether terrorists are capable of acquiring and using Weapons of Mass Destruction. Is this perception of a terrifying potential genocide a reality or is it generated by governments, security consultants and the media to create fear among the populous thereby getting public support for evermore stringent laws, policies and erosion of civil liberties. After all it has taken the few nations that possess Weapons of Mass Destruction technology, knowledge and skills many millions, if not billions, of pounds plus years of research to successfully develop these weapons.

In prehistory, ‘terrorist’ groups did not have the benefit of rapid communication systems of our time or even rapid transport means to deliver these communications. Communication methodologies and strategies are key factors that have developed throughout history. In 1830 the steam-powered printing press signalled the beginning of the modern era of communication and mass media. A short time later, the first newspapers as we know them today started large-scale production plus distribution although pamphlets and gazettes quite often with a political focus precede the newspaper. The News could now be reported in a timely, large scale and cost-effective manner. Further innovations provided cheaper and more economic printing methods and within 50 years of this, the cycle was complete a modern media. As Hoffman (2006) notes, “terrorists were quick to recognize the potential of this new mass communication technology.” (Hoffman, 2006) The Anarchists of the time also rapidly embraced the media and through their strategy of “propaganda by deed, deliberately sought to communicate their revolutionary message to a wide audience.” (Hoffman, 2006. pp.178) The modern mass media would hugely enhance their cause.

Jensen (2004) concludes that the media of the time was complicit in sensationalizing the terrorist acts and the power of the dynamite used by the anarchist. While the newspapers reported the Anarchists assassinations which matched the Anarchists’ desires, however, the tide turned when during one bombing, innocent bystanders were killed, a counterproductive event in its day. The media coverage tended to give the illusion that the Anarchists were a powerful movement ready to strike a victory against governments, in reality, there were very few victims of Anarchists outside Spain. The result of this over-inflation of the reality of the Anarchist movement made governments and police overreact and take repressive action which in turn led to revenge attacks from the Anarchists, and so the spiral of violence continued.

Jenkins (2006) suggests that it has not been the modernization of weaponry that has been the terrorist’s greatest advancement but that of the communications revolution, especially those developments from the 1960s and 1970s. Here he is talking about the ability to communicate quickly with a global audience through the medium of television. The terrorist acts could, for the first time be broadcast around the world almost instantaneously, spreading the message and inflicting psychological terror on millions. These audiences would hitherto have been unreachable now the terrorists could play out their dramatic acts with virtually guaranteed exposure.

Conway and McInerney (2012) discuss the impact the US media have had when females are involved in terrorist incidents. Females have long been involved in terrorism and though in the minority they tend to receive markedly more media coverage than their male counterparts. It would appear that the modern religious wave of terrorists has deliberately, or otherwise, exploited this tactic of using females. Partly due to the male-female culture in the middle east and the general perception of females being ”inherently non-violent’ remains in peoples minds.” (Bloom, 2011: 233) allows them to infiltrate targets more easily and therefore get more media coverage.

More recent advancements in communication technologies have brought us the internet where many hundreds of millions of people have ready access. The social media explosion has given people access to terrorist forums and material and the ability to comments and upload files, video’s, photographs and audio content online almost with complete anonymity. So for those searching for a cause, the ‘answer’ is a click away. Recent groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have embraced these technologies developing strategies to exploit this communication outlet. As is demonstrated on the international media, some groups invest heavily in modern technology and communication which is exhibited in the professional quality of the material being produced. No longer do the terrorist groups need a news media team but simply anyone with a mobile phone and access to the internet can live stream and post video to Twitter or YouTube.

Jenkins (2006) states that contemporary terrorists have been quick to exploit the communication technology of the modern age. The chosen method of communication is the internet where they can create websites to preach, instruct and initiate attacks. He suggests that although some of these communiques appear innocuous they can in fact be carrying coded messages, steganography. In ‘warfare’ through the ages this is no doubt anything new, what is is the exploitation of the technology, its speed and availability. “Subsequent [technological] innovations continued to shrink time and space”. (Rapoport, 2004). Rapaport further observes, the technological revolution has continued since the Anarchists exploitation of dynamite. The Anarchists were quick to see the development of railways as the latest technology they could manipulate to cross borders and rally support from emigrant populations who were disenchanted with their new home. This also allowed the contemporary terrorists to plan their attacks in the relative comfort of their own countries then travel, fairly easily and freely, over borders to mount an attack.

Globalisation inevitably allowed unrestricted movement of people around the world, until the introduction of recent restrictions, It was and is considerably easier to cross borders and emigrate which, has resulted in diverse cultures encountering each other, living side-by-side. In some circumstances, it has resulted in language, religious, lifestyle and cultural conflicts and no doubt has become more pronounced in the modern era where Global travel has become commonplace. In some instances, it has resulted in the perceived loss of identity for second and third generation emigrants who feel a need to identify themselves with their families lost culture and therefore may seek radical means to do so.

It is now clear that contemporary terrorists have developed from predominantly national action to acting with very few borders and boundaries with the exception of legal means developed in parallel to restrict the nature and breadth of their activities, for example, the Palestinians. This could be because as previously discussed due to the free movement of people for travel and emigration but it can also be attributed to the intended target audience is more accessible, being able to strike in their homeland.

National, international or global?

Here we must consider whether the terrorist organizations perceive the issues and therefore in many cases, their target to be national, international or global. The IRA for instance were mainly confined to the United Kingdom, or its sovereign areas, for attacks as their struggle was perceived to be against the English. “Everything related back to the struggle in their homeland, even when they went abroad in order to buy weapons, train, or raise money.” (Neumann, 2009) Historically ‘traditional’ terrorists stayed within national boundaries or within regions though some groups like the IRA would look overseas to sympathizers for recruitment, funding and weapons.

Before mass globalisation, many groups were restricted to attacking foreign targets within national borders, whether by choice as in the IRA or by restriction. Attacks could more easily be carried out on embassies, corporations and airliners as well as those persons or organizations viewed as collaborating with the foe inside the terrorists’ homelands.

However, numerous terrorist groups or organizations consider the struggle as being one on a global spectrum as we have seen with actions and rhetoric of Al Qaeda and ISIS who consider that the lands of Islam have been attacked and occupied by the Christian Crusaders; it is the duty of all Muslims throughout the world to destroy the none believers no matter where they are. “Al Qaeda, on the other hand, can be described as truly ‘deterritorialised”. (Neumann, 2009)

Affordable global travel is a key aspect of modernisation; the industrial revolution and beyond has given us vehicles that can travel halfway round the world in less than 24 hours, bringing potential terrorist targets within reach of groups with transnational aspirations. Wilkinson (2011) suggests that the Al Qaeda network now has the ability and capacity to take action in over 90 countries, therefore giving it global reach. Transnational attacks provide the terrorists an international audience, creating headlines in the traditional and modern media platforms increasing psychological terror. The Algeria FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) were the first group to implement this strategy as they successfully terrorized mainland France.

The method of recruiting and spreading the word has developed beyond personal contact to include, to a greater degree, the use of social media. Facebook and Twitter and many other social media outlets convey messages to those desiring a cause. No longer do these people have to meet face to face, they can do it via video. In turn, this has allowed the modern terrorist groups to morph from the traditional structure and organizational have been able, by design or accident, change their structure and mode of operation.

There have been ‘reformation’ of some terrorists who have renounced violence and pursued a political agenda and career. Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness were associated with the Provisional IRA and were, respectively, operational members of the IRA Army Council and second in command of the IRA unit in Derry. Their rehabilitation and acceptance into the political arena were no doubt both aided and restricted by the modern media of the time. At one point restrictions were placed on their media exposure and this was strictly controlled by the British government. Their contemporaries may still encounter some of these barriers’ and restrictions but now there are many effective alternatives to the mass media. Some modern ‘reformed’ terrorists have even used the power of social media to show they have been rehabilitated, though this is disputable. O’Mahony and Fair (2012) describe how the brutal Liberian terrorist warlords Prince Johnson and Joshua Blahyi used social media to reframe their personal histories in an attempt to become legitimate political and civil figures who could challenge the government at a legitimate level. These characters utilised platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to portray a positive image of a reformed character who repented for their past. This strategy appears to have succeeded as both are politicians. “Their ability to circumvent domestic and international recognition sends a powerful message both of the media power wielded by Blahyi and Johnson, and the inability of the Liberian state or the international community to challenge them by offering compelling counter-narratives”. (O’Mahony, Fair, 2012, pp.39).

Neumann (2009) noted contemporary terrorist organizations have adopted a diffuse structure. In the past, the structure of command and control had a clear hierarchy so that nothing could happen without the ‘commanders’. ETA and the IRA were such groups even though they favored a loose cell system. This hierarchical structure allowed the command to keep control of important elements of their strategy, nothing could be done without their knowledge or blessing. The organisations had clear goals and wanted to restrict indiscriminate attacks and casualties, they wanted “a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead”. (Neumann, 2009).

The environment after the end of the Second World War determined the structure of many groups, it also shaped many characteristics of the terrorist movements of the time including specific targeting strategies and the use of full-time professional units. At the turn of the century, these structures and characteristics noticeably changed. Rapaport referred to this change as a wave, the latest in four. Jenkins (2006) suggests this philosophy has changed with the latest wave of terrorists, the Jihadists. Using Al Qaeda as an example he describes the structure as undisciplined and fluid with core but arranged as a ‘network’ that has spread to many parts of the world. This structure makes it more difficult combat than the strict hierarchical organizations of the past, as cells can operate completely independently from the core and each other. Modern communications, such as the internet and applications, are employed to disseminate directives for independent action.

Independent action and a decentralized command could mean that the organizations strategy is not always adhered to and for most organisations in the past this was unacceptable. They thought it necessary to keep supporters and sponsors satisfied to help further the cause. Unwanted media coverage of indiscriminate or mass casualties could focus the authorities, and the publics’, attention on the group and in some cases trigger retribution on the organization, as was the case with the Anarchists.

With the modern terrorist groups this reliance on independent action, or loose relationships, has meant groups of, or, individual extremists have committed atrocities in the name of organisations that they have identified with. It would appear that many of these attacks are not sanctioned by the organization but they are now willing to claim responsibility. There have been numerous examples in recent years where there have been tentative links to organizations or no direct links at all. The 7/7 attackers in London had no direct links with the Al Qaeda organization but were obviously supportive of and motivated by the cause, and the ‘lone wolf’ Anders Breivik carried out attacks in Norway killing over 70 people in the name of the far-right,

State Sponsors

Neumann (2009) comments that in recent years the independent action by uncontrolled lone operators or independent cells clearly make the organisations structure disorganized and potentially hard to control and therefore they require some form of leadership even if this is loosely connected. Being able to use ‘independent action’ as a tactic has meant that organizations have become less dependent on state support. This has probably been a result of a thawing of the Cold War and terrorists being less reliant on state sponsors.

The end of the cold war brought new challenges for terrorist groups who lost Soviet state sponsorship, finance, logistics supplier and trainer. It also gave the Americans the opportunity to challenge countries identified as sponsoring terrorism, Syria and Libya for example, once the support and protection of the Soviet Union had declined. The Americans took the opportunity to impose sanctions against and even military action against these rogue countries, the sanctions eventually winning over military action.

State sponsorship did have one intelligence benefit, it allowed a method of control and monitoring of the groups under their control. The modern terrorists that grew out of this vacuum would be harder to combat and gather intelligence on, control was lost and both superpowers were becoming increasingly concerned with terrorism. Not having the support of states has required modern terrorists to find new ways of funding. As previously discussed independent operators have also, in some instances, meant self-funding as well which in turn has led to, and or been funded by crime in one form or another.

Terrorist groups had to adapt to losing state sponsorship and find a way of funding themselves. In some instances, supports could provide some funding, as with the IRA and US emigrant sympathizers but, crime appeared to be an obvious route. But until the 1990’s this route was rarely explored, commonly terrorist organizations did not want to be perceived as common criminals. Groups in the Americas were among the first to demand ransoms for kidnap which brought them millions of dollars, they would not be the last. Other groups had turned to drug trafficking, fraud, extortion and even investments in legitimate companies and investments.

Fund collection is one thing but its distribution is another problem for the modern terrorist. “Some terrorist organisations are skilled at moving money from charitable organisations and criminal operations through informal banking systems, money order and cash wire services, and regular banks. Some authorities have reduced high-volume transactions, but it is not clear that they have severely impeded terrorists' cash flows, which may simply move into less regulated areas.” (Jenkins, 2006) Therefore even with modern banking systems with the use of modern technology and banking methods the terrorist organizations still appear to be moving money to sponsor their actions.

Modern terrorism has been able to take advantage of unrest caused by the Arab Spring. Studies “do not lend support to the hypothesis that fostering democracy in the Middle East will provide a bulwark against terrorism”. (Piazza, 2007. pp.17). Piazza further suggests that these fledgling democracies are more at threat from terrorism, and to hosting terrorists, than those non democratic states, this risk is further increased if the country is involved in an armed conflict. There is a suggestion that this has allowed a rise in terrorism and support centering on the middle east where the majority of the attacks are now centered. This theory is further supported with the examples of Turkey and Tunisia where there have been recent attacks and democratic reform is faltering. The terrorists and guerrilla movements are applying modern strategies and tactics in an attempt to draw these countries into a conflict, which in turn draws them into conflict with their neighbours, an attempt at regional war to meet their ultimate aim of the Islamic caliphate.

What do terrorists want? Martin (2015) argues that there was clearly discernable difference the aims and goals of the ‘new terrorist’ as opposed to the previous generation. The traditional terrorist harbored ambitions, tangible and, theoretically, achievable. They did not want to destroy the system or society they thought they could work with it. Hamas and the IRA are examples of this philosophy where they eventually gave up violence and became part of the political system, they could negotiate.

The modern terrorists by comparison have a radically different strategy. Their ultimate aims in some cases appear to be ambiguous, unachievable and unnegotiable. In recent times the religious organizations have demanded the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate which historically covers many countries. They are not willing to have a multicultural approach and want all no believers converted or killed. This not only applies to other religions but also sects within Islam. This is a situation that cannot be negotiated or, so it would appear, be resolved through negotiation. Unless the aims change and there is no sign of that at the moment, this current wave will continue until it is outmoded by the fifth wave, yet to be described by Rapoport.

Conclusion

In conclusion, as modernity has transformed many aspects of the way terrorists and their organizations have developed and in parallel, the counter anti-terrorism responses have advance. The ways in which terrorist movements have adapted their structures, strategies and operations to modernization has been drastic and necessary particularly in the Islamic category.

As with technology, terrorism is an evolutionary process, an adaptation to modern times and the opportunities that it presents. From the earliest times in Prehistory to the present day, humankind has been striving to make technological advancements. The Stone Age brought us tools and fire, the Bronze Age metal and wheels for travel and communication, the Iron Age harder metals and better weapons. Modernity has given us evolving technologies and equally the availability for wider users and audiences to benefit, but also as a potential tool for malicious and perverse activity and acts. Contemporary terrorists are now adept at adopting modern technologies, developing novel strategies and tactics to advance their causes.

The fourth wave, Religion, as described by Rapoport’s ‘four waves’, is due to end in less than two decades if the 40 year cycle hold true. Discussions suggest the fifth wave could be ‘Net war’, lone cyber terrorists hacking into systems that control aircraft systems, critical infrastructures or missile systems. A truly frightening prospect but the possibilities of this type of attack become more realistic, and probable, as terrorist organizations recruit the new generation of highly educated disaffected amateur terrorists.

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