Case study. The U.K’s response to domestic terrorism after 9/11 and 7/7; CONTEST and Operation Kratos.

Introduction

For centuries the United Kingdom (UK) has been countering terrorist action on its sovereign territory and overseas. The focus most recently has been on events post 9/11 when, Prime Minister Tony Blair, provided support to George Bush in the fight against the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT).

Historically, on the domestic front, the UK has countered numerous terrorist groups and ideologies from the 1605 ‘Gunpowder plot’ to blow up the House of Lords, through to anarchist attacks on public places, the bombings by radical Fenians of the mid 1800’s, to the 1906 assassination of an Indian Official Sir Curzon-Wyllie in London by the Indian Nationalist Madan Lal Dhingra and more recently, the Irish Republic Army insurgency from 1970’s to the late 1990’s. In the years after 9/11, the UK has experienced actions, and countered numerous plots, by religiously non-state actors affiliated to Al Qaeda and ISIS as well as the far-right.

The UK government and counterterrorism strategists have continually initiated, developed and adopted measures to counter and minimise the effects of violent actions planned by individual terrorists or groups. Over time the UK has evolved its counterterrorism strategy and tactics, slowly adjusting the balance of using ‘hard’ counterterrorism measures such as target hardening, military actions, intelligence and punitive measures, and ‘soft’ counterterrorism measures, “proactive, designed to address root causes and support for terrorism” (Crelinsten, 2014), in an attempt to conduct the ‘fight’ on two levels. On the one hand the ‘hard' and swift application of brute force and conversely long-term ‘softer’ “more ethical approach providing an “alternative to raw power politics“ (Aly, 2013).

This essay will consider the changing face of UK counterterrorism after the events of 9/11 and 7/7 by examining the effects of CONTEST and ‘Operation Kratos’ in countering the ‘new’ wave of domestic religious terrorism.

Approaches to Domestic Counter-terrorism

Holmes ( (Holmes, 2015) suggests governments must address the challenge of domestic terrorism carefully to achieve successful control or defeat. The key is to develop effective coordination between departments, collating and producing timely intelligence, having a well-trained and capable police force and a transparent and just legal system. "Being responsive to legitimate grievances may increase the government's popular support and decrease overt and tactic support to terrorists. However, governments must be careful not to create new complaints by attending to old grievances."

After the events of 9/11 and the declaration of the ‘war on terror’, a military-led global campaign was launched against terrorism. The war on terror and the military campaign became rooted in the minds of the public “as a cultural/ ideological clash between the culturally progressive West and the culturally resistant Islam.” (Aly, Balbi, & Jacques, 2015) The might of the American military, ‘hard power', was first unleashed in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan, where American and British intelligence agencies noted excessive use of ‘hard power' was, in fact, having a negative effect on the prevention of terrorism, damaging the influence of America and the West in general. The growing support for terrorism was not confined to the countries where the fight was active, an element of support grew in the UK. Many Muslims believed the war was unjust and their ‘brothers' overseas were being slaughtered by the imperial powers of the west.

Globalization and the new media have heralded an age where terrorism has easily reached new audiences, potential groups of supporters often willing to take up the cause of others, to strike a blow for the cause in their homelands. Domestic terrorism is nothing new, history shows us the majority of terrorist attacks are committed by residents of the country where atrocities are being committed. In more recent times these ‘homegrown’ and radicalised terrorists have been identified as being second or third generation ‘immigrants’ who have been significantly influenced by the ‘war on terror’ and the killing of ‘innocent’ Muslims by the west.

Domestic terrorism is not a unique challenge to the UK, but it requires the careful development of policies and strategies, many of which are not compatible with parallel international counterterrorism strategies. Domestic strategies still often incorporate international cooperation between countries, but a domestic problem requires a domestic response that addresses and reflects domestic political aims, public support and grievances, internal security, legislation, human rights, military mobilisation, and when deemed appropriate, the ‘use of force’, what could be deemed as ‘political violence’. In short, domestic terrorism requires (amongst other things) a domestic response.

In the UK, response strategies evolved through successive governments including military and policing solutions and more recently community programmes and initiatives, both pro-active and reactive, and, depending on the aim, the application of both short and long-term policies. State response is vitally important as the terrorists’ grievances often lack clarity, are complex and may actually have tangible demands the state can address, for instance, demands by ISIS to establish a Caliphate. There are other reasons why a state may not address the causes or demands of a terrorist group, for instance, a lack of political will or resources, financial or material.

When fighting terrorism, governments have adopted two general models of counterterrorism termed the ‘War’ and ‘Criminal Justice’ (CJ) models. There are merits and challenges for each model; careful consideration should be given to how, where, when, why, the rationale for deployment. The consequences of misuse of a model can be significant; successful use overseas, as in the ‘war on terror’, does not guarantee effectiveness on the domestic front, for example, the over militarisation of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The war model can be described “as if it were an act of war or insurgency. Because wars are usually fought between states, countering terrorism within a war model implies that the terrorist group represents the equivalent of a state." (Crelinsten, 2014) The war model allows for a state to rapidly intervene with the power of the military on the offensive to kill and deter terrorist attacks. There are substantial concerns with the ‘war model', even overseas as it has the potential to be responsible for “the deaths of innocence, the creation of martyrs, and the provocation of retaliation.” (Holmes, 2015) As recent domestic attacks have shown, this strategy can be counterproductive as terrorist groups gain overseas support from the ‘collateral damage' of the ‘war model' inspiring individuals to attack the British peoples.

Domestically, the ‘war model' should be used with extreme caution, it can provoke a negative response from the public while providing the terrorists with the violent reaction they may desire. In democratic states, the use of the ‘CJ' system is more likely, often in combination with military or military-style tactics. The ‘CJ' model classifies terrorism as a crime because "the most common terrorist tactics, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombing and armed attacks, the end result is usually the infliction of injury or loss of life or the destruction of property, all of which are universally proscribed in the criminal law of all nations.” (Crelinsten, 2014) To use the ‘CJ' model, the state must have the organisational infrastructure, legal system and framework, trained personnel and material resources at its disposal to achieve its objectives.

Since 7/7 the UK government has balanced the domestic counterterrorism strategy in favour of the ‘CJ’ model, preferring to hand primacy to the police but with support from the military when required, for example after the 2017 Manchester bombing. This has allowed the introduction of innovative strategies like CONTEST and PREVENT which engage emergency services, non-government agencies and society. In fashioning these strategies, the government has recently attempted to respond to the changing ideological threat of terrorists, from nationalists to religious extremists, affecting what appears to be the most effective response.

Lessons from History

During the three decades of the of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (NI), 1968 to 1998, the UK endured many domestic acts of terrorism, including the death of over 2,300 people in NI and 100 on the UK mainland. These events were motivated by political and religious allegiances, both Unionists /Loyalists in support of the British government and Nationalists /Republicans wanting home rule, were responsible for terrorist operations.

Active between 1970 and 2005, the most prominent of the groups active against the British was the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Though their targets were predominantly military and security personnel in NI, they later carried out high-profile attacks on the UK mainland, notably on ‘economic targets', with the specific aim of causing costly financial harm to the UK government. The strategy of PIRA was not to randomly ‘kill many', but to “wear down the British will to retain NI as a constituent part of the UK but, from the 1970s onwards, the fight for British withdrawal and an all- Ireland socialist republic was fought on both the military level and the political one.” (Muro, 2010) The British government instigated measures within a legal framework ultimately introducing the ‘Prevention of Terrorisms Act’ in 1974 and later modified in the 80s and 90s. The act and its supporting measures focused on the NI issue and included outlawing supporting and membership of the IRA and detention without charge and internment.

The use of the counterterrorism ‘war model’ could be argued as being far from successful. The “troubles” presented a significant problem for the British army as the situation deteriorated in 1972. Various initiatives of ‘military rule’, such as internment, curfews, torture and the shooting of civilians, greatly added to the problem, providing the IRA with sustained grassroots support. Gerry Adams later claimed "internment had helped create the modern IRA", and Bloody Sunday "had turned his community definitively against the army". (Newsinger, 2015) The resultant failure of the 1970’s counterinsurgency strategy required the government to rethink and develop an "internal security" strategy more suited to the circumstances it now faced.

The British government had realised repressive counterterrorism strategies were a largely unsuccessful solution, the government required both political and security strategies to address the complex nature of the problem. In “1973, the British sponsored the signature of the Sunningdale Agreement, which established a temporary measure that provided some form of devolved cross-community government for the province, aimed at containing the conflict in NI.” (Muro, 2010) Though this agreement collapsed in 1974, later replaced with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, it resulted in the British Army providing a supporting role and primacy handed to the police, surveillance units and with specialist support from the Special Air Services (SAS). In implementing the ‘CJ’ model it was believed the tide would turn in favour of the government, shootings were replaced with beatings, torture-induced confessions and juryless courts, a rather opaque system that drew suspicion from the public. As British surveillance operations became more sophisticated, they succeeded in infiltrating the very heart of the IRA making it extremely difficult for units to continue acts of terrorism. The nationalist community had become weary of the conflict, and the IRA "was brought to terms by process of attrition, by the British success in containing its struggle while operating a "shoot to kill" policy together with the wearing down of the nationalist community." (Newsinger, 2015)

In parallel, The British had the ‘support’ of loyalist paramilitaries who were assisting and abetted by the British to wage a campaign against the nationalist community, to aid the British counterinsurgency strategic aims. Though this alliance has never been fully made public, the loyalists no doubt aided the government in neutralising the IRA. The government did not defeat the IRA but managed to contain the nationalists, protecting British interests and move towards peace in the provinces.

The British government had learnt some valuable lessons in counterterrorism when dealing with domestic nationalist terrorism. Engaging in the propaganda of ‘hearts and minds’ could be effective in promoting the governments campaign and gaining public support but extremely damaging if ill-conceived. One major lesson was concerned regarding the use of the military in domestic settings; the over-militarisation of the measures introduced, and the introduction of draconian and covert legislation proved challenging to defend, ultimately costing the British government valuable local and national public support. The effective strategy had developed a solution "The agreement was all-inclusive and established a devolved Assembly, executive power- sharing and an institutionalised Irish dimension.” (Muro, 2010)

The Counterterrorism After 9/11 and 7/7

The domestic counterterrorism experiences of NI helped shape the British government's strategy after the events of 9/11, the 2003 Operation CREVICE bombing plot, the 2004 Madrid Train bombings, the 2005 7/7 London bombings and the 21/7 failed attacks, but lessons were still to be learnt as the ideology and tactics of the terrorists differed. The ‘new’ threat, in the shape of religious extremism, has deployed tactics involving multiple location suicide bombings and deadly opportunistic and random melee attacks on innocent members of the public. No longer is the goal to damage the state economy directly but instead, creating fear and shocking audiences into submission is the desired outcome to sway public opinion and influence government overseas strategy.

In the aftermath of the horrific events of 7/7, it became clear British nationals had declared allegiance to Al Qaeda, who in turn released videos and claims of responsibility. The focus of the counterterrorism operation quickly focused on the domestic Muslim communities. “The framing of communities as both risky/suspect and as protagonists in campaigns against terrorism is something that scholars of ‘suspect communities’ have noted as shared between the experiences of Irish communities during the era of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and those of contemporary Muslim communities.” (Heath-Kelly, 2012) This has projected the Muslim community to the forefront of British community policing.

Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) express concern that the counterterrorism policies and laws since 9/11 have defined the British Muslim society as a suspect community which in itself may turn Muslims, especially students and young people, towards extremism and acts of terrorism. This view was not unfounded as Sageman (2010) notes the appearance of ‘radicalisation discourse’ gained prominence in Britain after the events of 7/7, where there was a realisation the bombers were ‘home-grown' terrorists’. The CONTEST strategy directly associates religious ‘ideas’ with “the ‘New Terrorism’ discourse depicts a fundamentally more dangerous (because it is) religious terrorism, contrasting it with old-fashioned political and instrumental terrorism.” (Heath-Kelly, 2012)

CONTEST

After the events of 7/7, a press conference on the 5th August 2005 saw the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair announce to the world; “Let no one be in doubt, the rules of the game have changed.” (Cobain & MacAskill, 2015) Within weeks of the attacks the government and security apparatus had established several comprehensive measures to combat the ‘new’ threat religious terrorism posed to the British mainland. These measures included closing mosques, deportations and control orders for nationals, all of which had the potential to erode civil and human rights. The government believed the public would demand national security above the rights of the individual.

The British government had already formulated plans in the years between 9/11 and 7/7. During this time the CONTEST strategy was launched in 2003 and subsequently updated, 2006, 2009 and 2011, but only became public in the year after the 2005 attacks in London. The CONTEST counterterrorism strategy comprised of four strands, the four ‘P’s’ of PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE. The aim of the CONTEST strategy was to “reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence." (HM Government, 2011) The CONTEST strategy was required to address the ‘new’ threat of religious terrorism, both on the domestic front and overseas. Heath-Kelly suggests the link between religious extremists, radicalisation and religious terrorism is “blatantly apparent in statements (which precede the ‘securitisation’ of ideologues and ‘self- starting networks’ of terrorists) that ‘A new form of terrorism emerged overseas in the late seventies and early eighties’ (Home Office 2009a, 10).” (Heath-Kelly, 2012)

The government counterterrorism strategists realised over militarization was not the answer, hard lessons were learned in NI. CONTEST was implemented in a realization the immediate threat would need to be countered but the causes, where terrorists were recruited to violence, also needed tackling. This long-term threat from domestic terrorists would need the support of the domestic population and the communities where the terrorists were being recruited. It was now recognised UK residents were travelling overseas, as well as using new media, to receive terrorist training and engage in related activities both overseas and at ‘home’.

PURSUE

The PURSUE element of CONTEST was introduced to deal with the investigation detection and prosecution of terrorism. The idea was to move away from being reactive; the strategy was to be proactive and preemptive, hunting down suspected terrorists. (Sabir, 2014) Suggests PURSUE employs counterinsurgency principles, as does PREVENT, with the aim to identify and bring to justice individuals who display ‘hostile’ ideology and behaviour which could be considered a route towards terrorism. PURSUE, endorses the use of exceptional and lethal force, operation Kratos, therefore employing counterinsurgency strategies within the counterterrorism model, measures normally reserved for overseas operations.

PREVENT

PREVENT was introduced to focus on the ‘new’ threat posed by extremism and religiously motivated terrorism has sought the involvement of society and communities where terrorism incubates. The policy attempts to encourage social integration and shared values while empowering communities to detect potential terrorists. Unlike PURSUE, PREVENT is promoted as a long-term, transparent and overt strategy intended to Community trust and engagement is key to the success in combatting the challenge posed by groups who promote radical ideology, both in society and new media. The sensitive nature of the work means the workers must build relations within the’ target’ societies, failing this there is a risk important intelligence will not reach the authorities. PREVENT operates on the premise the majority of the domestic population find terrorism unpalatable in any form with the purpose to detect and help the small minorities who may be vulnerable to radicalism. By empowering the community to become self-policing and assisting the domestic community at large, potential terrorists can be identified and neutralised before they commit violent acts.

PROTECT

In recent years the UK has come to accept the many vulnerabilities both overseas and domestically which must be defended against terrorist attacks. The list of potential targets has notably changed from the threat posed by the nationalist groups of the 1970s where not only Critical National Infrastructure, aviation and economic targets but also with the current threat comes risks " too crowded places and in safeguarding hazardous materials which may be used by terrorists in an attack." (HM Government, 2011).

As many of the current operational extremists have travelled and trained overseas the border security needs increased attention with the cooperation of international partners and technology. The command structure of the ‘Border Command’ has been rationalised to improve the identification and movement of terrorist suspects backed up by advanced detection technologies to identify persons who may be planning to commit or train in terrorist activities. One significant development in counterterrorism since the introduction of CONTEST is the collaboration with the private sector to protect, secure and develop security solutions. This partnership is targeted at reducing the risk of a terrorist attack to an acceptable level, sharing intelligence when appropriate and keeping the costs of security solutions at an appropriate level.

PREPARE

After the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing targeting Margaret Thatcher, the IRA released a statement proclaiming “Today we were unlucky but remember we have only to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.” The ‘PREPARE' element of the strategy recognises the scale of the threat the British people and government face and as recent events have shown, the PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECT strategies, cannot stop all attacks. Plans have been formulated and personnel trained to deal with active incidents and the after-effects.

The tactics used in and since the attacks of 7/7 have required the development of specialist counterterrorism tactics to “developing more effective responses to an attack of the kind that took place in Mumbai between 26-29 November 2008. Significant changes have been made to police firearms resources and tactics, and to the multi- agency response that such incidents would require.” (HM Government, 2011) Such attacks, and those using biological, radiological and nuclear materials, once thought of as unthinkable, have become a reality and must have a robust multi-agency response to minimise the effects and spare lives.

Operation Kratos, ‘Shoot to Kill’.

When discussing the development and implementation of effective counterterrorism policy, Holmes (2015), suggests one of the principal aims of counterterrorism, in theory, is a simple one, basically "to catch or kill as many of the enemy that you can, without creating more." In a liberal democracy, the impact of deploying such a policy could, and almost defiantly would, result in the government having to deal with and understand numerous other challenges. Killing terrorists creates challenges and complications. After the events of 9/11, the UK formulated a strategy, comprising of a series of measures, under the codename ‘Operation Kratos' aimed at combatting the threat of suicide terrorists. In 2005, after the tragic shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes on July 22nd, the terms of the Operation were released into the public domain. The UK public was shocked such tactics could be authorised and the apparent blatant contravention of basic Human Rights. The argument used by the government and police was that there was a case for minimum force such as a slap but also use of ‘shoot to kill'; a memo released by the Metropolitan Police (2005) stated that the "tactics are only ever used when necessary."

In a 2005 memo, aiming to limit the damage of the incident, the Metropolitan police explained the tactic had been conceived to protect and safeguard the public against terrorists seeking mass casualties, and it was not intended to “target communities” or operate outside of the law. The reality was the public of England in 2005 wanted to be guaranteed safety and security on their streets, but they were less accepting of the police being authorised to ‘shoot to kill'. The government must have and strengthen broad support from the domestic population, grow its intelligence capability to offer robust security while consistently applying transparent rules of democratic governance. As Holmes (2015) suggests for a democratic state to combat terrorism successfully "both security (including avoiding overreaction and under reaction) and political integration (including political support, tolerance to the loyal opposition, and maintenance of human rights) must be prioritised. To do so, the state must be strengthened, including improving transparency and accountability."

Though the public has shown support for the British military and its deadly actions overseas in support of the GWOT this was to some extent not extended to police counterterrorism actions at home. However as recent events in Manchester and London demonstrated, for example, the June 2017 London Bridge attack where the three attackers were shot dead by armed police, the British public, and media, have become tolerant and more supportive, of policies such as arming the police, giving authority, in certain circumstances, to ‘shoot to kill’ terrorist suspects with the intention of protecting the public.

Where ‘shoot to kill was once the domain of the military in Ireland in their fight against the IRA, the Police have been able to take over this role. The UK has now domestically adopted the ‘CJ model’ as opposed to the ‘War model’ because as Crelinsten suggests “the most common terrorist tactics, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombing and armed attacks, the result is usually the infliction of injury or loss of life or the destruction of property, all of which are universally proscribed in the criminal law of all nations.” (Crelinsten, 2014) This also has the effect of portraying terrorism as a criminal offence, keeping it in sight of the public and their domain, transferring the judgement to judges who uphold transparent legal processes, a process accepted by the general public. Thus, over the years from 9/11 to the present, the ‘shoot to kill’ strategy, though secretly implemented in the early 2000s, Carr (2017) suggests, it has endured as a long-term counterterrorism strategy to become an acceptable reality, keeping the public safe.

Evaluation

In 2000, just before the events of 9/11, the British government adopted the Terrorism Act learning many bloody lessons from a counterterrorism campaign fought in NI. This legislation looked back at the lessons learned and was one of the first to identify the changing nature of terrorism and the growing threat of Islamic terrorism on the British mainland. This ‘new' Islamic threat presented challenges requiring a holistic counterterrorism approach. In 2003 Sir David Omand was tasked with developing the strategy, CONTEST, later developments were implemented in 2006, 2009 and 2011. (Brady, 2016)

Since the events of 7/7 the British mainland has recorded a low number of ‘successful' attacks but is this due to the success of CONTEST, and the four major strands PROTECT, PREVENT, PURSUE and PREPARE? “CONTEST echoes the injunction that communities must learn to deploy themselves against extremists and extremist narratives in their midst.“ (Heath-Kelly, 2012)

Muro (2010) suggests some strategies and tactics can be adapted to combat terrorist threats including arresting individuals and key figures in the use of proactive policing tactics which follow the rule of law. Muro suggests the group's ideology, ‘left-wing', ‘right-wing', ‘religious' or ‘nationalist', should be considered as should the support base, noting religious and ethno-nationalist ideologies "tend to have strong sources of support among the local population whereas contemporary far-right groups and Marxist-Leninist groups tend to rely on smaller urban networks.” It is with this in mind CONTEST, with the religious, ideological threat, was developed to engage the Muslim community.

To establish the effectiveness of strategies, data must be collected and collated and then evaluated to assess its effectiveness. The availability of CONTEST statistics is generally not made public due to ‘national security', the narrative often provided around the PROTECT, PURSUE and PREPARE strands usually consists of ambiguous statements proclaiming arrests and the successful detection of terror plots. The failure of the CONTEST strategy, or the ‘successful’ application of operation Kratos, are communicated to the domestic public in detail by the media and citizen journalists on social media, using ‘expert commentators’ and government soundbites. Even information released from ‘official sources’ is translucent as not to provide intelligence on operational procedures, performance and effectiveness. Brady (2016) suggests “robust and independent evaluation of CONTEST has not been undertaken from a quantitative approach, some level of evaluation has taken place and can be taken into consideration when moving forward with future analysis of the strategy.” Until there is more transparent evaluation, these strands will be difficult for public researchers to reliably and accurately assess; even if the information were freely available what is deemed as ‘successful' would be open to debate.

Since 2014 the UK threat level has remained at ‘SEVERE', there have been numerous high-profile attacks in the years to date. The main attack profile has changed since 7/7 to include low-tech melee type ‘random' attacks. Compared to other international attacks, in Europe and the USA, the fatalities have been low. Therefore, with a large number of attacks taking place in the UK in 2015, although resulting in very few fatalities this could suggest “CONTEST must be having some impact on mitigating attacks taking place in the UK.” (Brady, 2016)

Conversely, PREVENT operates in the community and is effective before any crime is committed. The use of covert policing would not be compatible with gaining the trust of the public and therefore, to be successful, PREVENT demands ‘transparent’ collaboration between the government, NGO’s and all communities. As PREVENT is in clear site of the communities it wishes to ‘penetrate' it has appeared most challenging, raising suspicion from Muslim communities. Briggs (2010) notes after the events of 7/7 the Muslim community became a ‘suspect community’ as the attacks provided ‘evidence’ of radicalised networks from within.’ One difficulty with this strategy is the assumption of a cohesive British Muslim community and the community is harbouring potential terrorists. The fact is “in practice, those who conduct terrorist attacks are frequently not close to key community stakeholders but rather keep a low- profile away from such individuals, either because they disagree ideologically with religious community leaders or because they wish to avoid detection, or both.” (Heath- Kelly, 2012) The policy has ultimately propagated an uneasy relationship between the police and the Muslim community, a community who has increasingly complained of experiencing alienation and over scrutinisation by the government.

The PREVENT strategy gives the impression good vulnerable Muslims, and to lesser degree members of other social groups, can become radicalised ‘bad’ members of the British community. These individuals travel a blurred path from becoming ‘at risk' of ‘becoming risky'. Heath-Kelly (2012) reasons PREVENT definitions of ‘risk' and ‘risky', the ‘radicalisation process', is not adequately defined or understood and therefore not being responded to correctly. “Neither the PREVENT strategy nor scholars of radicalisation can explain when a person makes the transition from being ‘at risk’ to ‘risky’. When should they be determined as having completed the ‘process’ of radicalisation and to have reached a point of being ‘radicalised’?” This process must be understood to identify those at risk, how to respond and when to intervene.

Thiel (2009) writes; that some British Muslims sympathise with the plight of Muslims overseas, whilst feeling victimised and discriminated against in the UK. He believes this negative discrimination can motivate individuals to follow the path of radicalisation and violence, through underground networks of like-minded individuals. Though this number is small, there is evidence some Muslim communities do harbour a “larger level of sympathy and support for al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism, which may act to increase the overall resilience and effectiveness of terrorist activity.”

Since its introduction, the PREVENT strategy has undergone numerous adaptations and in the wake of BREXIT new adaptations may be required. With the steady ‘apparent' growth in racism and home-grown radicals, it is essential to have a definitive understanding of the radicalisation process, but this is far from fully understood. Combined with a rise in far-right and nationalist ideology CONTEST will have to refocus on the revival of these terrorist ideologies as well as the Islamic threat.

Now, the public evaluation of the counterterrorism strategy is confined to limiting the fatalities in the domestic arena and therefore ‘success' in counterterrorism is the absence of ‘successful' terrorist attacks and the publication by the government of detected plots. Unrestricted research must be carried out to establish if CONTEST “is up for the task and whether counter-terrorism measures have indeed been successful, or just lucky.” (Brady, 2016)

Conclusion

9/11 brought a realisation that the ‘new’ terrorists were taking the fight to the enemy using tactics and methods believed previously ‘unthinkable’. With 7/7 came the realisation that domestic terrorism had acquired religious overtones allied with Al Qaeda and this threat, from radicalised and disaffected individuals, was little understood. Countering this ‘new’ threat would require a diverse counterterrorist strategy and to be effective it would require the government, emergency services, non-governmental organisations and society to work together providing intelligence and permeating the communities where these individuals operate. This signalled the introduction of CONTEST, and a policy, initially secretly enacted, to protect the public in real-time by stopping the attackers ‘dead’ in their tracks, Operation Kratos.

Of the four strands of CONTEST, PREVENT has come under much scrutiny as it operates in the public arena, where the other strands are less visible due to national security concerns. PREVENT has attracted criticism as it assumes to engage ‘target communities' while arguably ignoring lessons from past campaigns and credible threats from other ideologies. In targeting the Muslim community, Blair’s Labour government and consecutive governments affirmed the ‘new' threat was not due to the ideology of ‘good' Islam but pursued and attempted to PREVENT ‘bad theology' through what could be described as ‘Islamophobic policing' and policies. The government should be vigilant with this strategy and establish why people become radicalised, as PREVENT could encourage alienated youth to become radicalised.

The British domestic counterterrorism policy since 2000 has avoided over militarisation, used lessons from the ‘troubles' in Ireland, limiting the use of the military to specialist covert operations, interception of suspect aircraft and patrolling of territorial waters. However as overt and covert counterterrorism roles become more commonly a police domain there is a danger the police become a para-military force, potentially affecting public support.

One thing is certain; the public has accepted the opaque policies of CONTEST and operations such as Kratos, are also predominantly accepting or at least tolerant of these radical policies. This is likely due to the shock and barbarity of ‘successful' attacks on the British mainland and the comparatively low attack ‘success' rate compared to Europe and America. Due to a void of publicly accessible data on covert operations and due to national security concerns, informed evaluation on the success of CONTEST is challenging but on balance, “British counter-terrorism has scored successes and failures; it cannot be said that it has not worked.” (Klausen, 2009)

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