Discuss the view that the response to terrorism can be said to be ‘propaganda of the deed’.

Introduction

Throughout history, terrorist groups have adopted the use of propaganda as one of their weapons of choice, a tool to help them survive by keeping their goals fresh in the audiences’ minds. Propaganda has been shown to be influential, the psychological effects arguably used as a support mechanism for the terrorist organisation and one that can damage the ability of the target state counterterrorism effort. Consequently, efforts of states to counter this threat include development and application of a “psychological component” to their counterterrorism strategy. In the past, most democratic states have been apprehensive about employing such tactics as the public and wider audience can become sceptical and mistrustful of state propaganda, potentially further feeding the counter narrative of the terrorist group.

The use of state ‘propaganda of the deed’ (POTD) is, in itself, not unheard of, as Marshall McLuhan, an influential media theory expert commented: “the Cold War as a state of continuing hostility waged largely by non-military means, most importantly propaganda and political agitation.” (Bolt, Betz, & Azari, 2008)

In the years since the events of 9/11 states have realised counter propaganda tools are too important to disregard when competing with such groups as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. In Europe significant sections of the public became agitated and incensed, but not necessarily desensitised, to the horrifying deeds of terrorist atrocities. Democratic governments are now addressing the counter propaganda as they realise the public now agree; “ in a choice of evils, terrorism was worse than government publicity to help control it.” (Tugwell, 2018) Therefore, ‘lawful deeds’, both violent and violent, have now be adopted in the irregular ‘war on terror’. This strategy has been taken on-board to the extent the UK Home Office has announced an ‘artificial intelligent’ program to block Islamic State propaganda, the introduction of which is a propaganda statement.

‘Propaganda of the Deed’

In the nineteenth century, many Anarchist groups were waging a war of terror predominantly in European countries. In their fight, the anarchists realised that winning the propaganda war was crucial to delivering their message to the audience. The term ‘Propaganda of the deed’ was used in the 1870’s by the Italian Anarchists, used to describe rural insurrections, however within 20 years it was being used to describe acts of terrorism and assassination. These acts were intended to spark a public uprising, acts meant to motivate the audience into a revolution against the state.

Over time there have been numerous interpretations of the meaning of ‘POTD’, normally to suit the individuals and groups aims. Therefore, some Anarchist groups, for instance, those who were trying to influence and mobilise an illiterate audience who interpreted the ‘POTD’ positively hence were attracted to joining the group. In 1877 the ‘Bulletin de la Federation Jurassienne’, a revolutionary journal in Switzerland, printed an article edited by the French socialist and leader of the ‘possibilistes’ group, Paul Brousse, and co-authored by the Russian radical intellectual Peter Kropotkin. The article, which transformed the traditional meaning of the phrase POTD, suggested the “traditional forms of propaganda, discussion, and personal contact, it was explained, were inherently limited in their ability to reach the masses; these, it was argued, must henceforth be supplemented by deeds. The Paris Commune was offered as a powerful example of what ordinary men might achieve, by way of spreading the anarchist message, but even more modest performances, such as the demonstration which were being held around that time at Berne, were thought immensely worthy of emulation.” (Flemming, 1980)

Flemming (1980) notes, two years later that Peter Kropotkin was reinforcing this ‘modern’ translation of the ‘deed’ and again advocating a requirement for ‘action’, deeds, to transmit the message to the masses as the message could not be conveyed sufficiently by “speeches and the pen”. Physical acts and group action appealed to the masses.

In the same period of history, the Russian founder of collectivist anarchism and revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin philosophised about the communicative potential of acts of political violence. Of POTD he wrote: “All of us must now embark on stormy revolutionary seas, and from this very moment we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda. Let us say less about principles, whenever circumstances and revolutionary policy demand it, i.e., during our momentary weakness in relation to the enemy, but let us at all times and under all circumstances be adamantly consistent in our action. For in this lies the salvation of the revolution”. (Jackson, 2011)

Not all supporters of the POTD were so restrained in their contemplations of what form these ‘deeds’ should take. One of the most outspoken persons of this time was Anarchist Johann Joseph Most, of German American heritage. Most was a politician, newspapers editor and speaker, his translation of the POTD did not stop at violent acts against both property and persons, he advocated murder. Most, as an advocate of ‘direct action’, and through his German-language paper Die Freiheit, he declared the “existing system will be the quickest and most radically overthrown by the annihilation of its exponents. Therefore, massacres of the enemies of the people must be set in motion.” (McElroy, 2003)

The value of POTD for terrorist organisations as a symbol of the struggle against a state is not in any doubt. In recent years, with Al Qaeda and the mind-blowing attacks on the Twin Towers of 9/11 and the media-frenzied coverage of the beheadings of western, and other nationals, by ISIS the tradition of the POTD philosophy continues with the enthusiasm shown by the early adaptors, the Anarchists.

Symbolic Deeds

The tactics incorporated into the strategies of terrorist organisations have often been asymmetric in nature as they are required to stay one step ahead of states. States accordingly are required to respond to this asymmetry with suitable countermeasures which they expect will be supported by the public and draw their support. In many past instances, the response was seen as being military in nature, where attempts were made to wage a ‘war’ on the terrorists, optimistically in an attempt to disrupt the terrorist organisations in turn making them less effective to commit actions of violence. In effect, POTD is asymmetry, and one counterterrorism strategy could be to counter the propaganda by producing propaganda through state ‘deeds’, ‘deeds’ comprising of words, media messages, physical action and, where necessary, ‘legitimate violence’. The actions of many counterterrorist organisations also send messages, including “matching messengers to the audience based on age, race, gender, and religious affiliation, among others” (Pizzuto, 2013), intended or sometimes not, to suit the context, the desired audience, the public, terrorist organisations and individuals, friendly states or conversely state sponsors of terrorism.

This essay will discuss whether the response to terrorism can be argued as POTD. By examining state deeds and the intended audiences we shall analyse the effects of propaganda, do their actions assist counterterrorist agencies in their fight against terrorism and if so to what degree? Enlisting the support of the public, deterring terrorist action, assisting friendly states and deterring state sponsors through counterterrorism POTD is ultimately possible. By discussing counterterrorism strategies including public protection, conciliation and state violence we can show proof public support is not limited to particular non-violent government responses to counterterrorism. “Whichever form a counterterrorism measure takes, it appears that its efficacy will depend not just on the professionalism with which it is executed, but above all on the responses it evokes among the supporters of both the state and its adversary.” Bart Schuurman (2013)

For this essay, the working definition of Propaganda of the deed will be the very latest, defined as: “information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view” through “an action that is performed intentionally or consciously” (English Oxford Dictionary, 2018) to secure the attention of the populous through symbolic action.

When examining POTD it is important to define what criteria could be suitably applied to the philosophy of a state. Could a state ever legitimately use the interpretation favoured by Paul Brousse, the government instigated protests through media hype for example, or the more radical and violent philosophies of Johann Joseph Most, extreme violence and assassination? Tugwell (2018) proposes we are surrounded by propaganda, its use is endemic in modern society commenting, “yet while terror has a singular purpose, inducing fear and uncertainty, propaganda can and does serve every imaginable purpose from religion to politics to commerce.” Considered use of propaganda plays a role in shaping our perceptions, this is being used in modern counterterrorism strategies to send messages to actors and the public alike.

State actors now understand that the use of words and images is not always sufficient to create the propaganda to enthuse the public, for them to be ‘mobilized to rise up’ and join in the fight to defeat terrorism. The issue is, done incorrectly the state is in danger of alienating the population and feeding further terrorist action from disenfranchised groups. If used carefully states can and do use, POTD to great effect in the form of symbolic actions. During the Gulf wars and in the fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS, the new media has been used spectacularly as POTD. Night after night, the news showed the might of the western states targeting terrorist actors, clearly a case of sending a message; the war against terrorism is being won with remote and precision-guided weaponry. For example, the decision in 2003 by Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister at the time, to encircle Heathrow airport with military assets after a ‘credible’ threat assessment of a terrorist attack, these events were clearly a show of state power to reassure the public.

If violence is the key to POTD’ we need look no further than Weber (1994) to legitimize the states use of violence. "In the past the most diverse kinds of associations-beginning with the clan-have regarded physical violence as a quite normal instrument. Nowadays, by contrast, we have to say that the state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory, this 'territory' being another of the defining characteristics of the state. For the specific feature of the present is that the right to use physical violence is attributed to any and all other associations or individuals only to the extent that the state for its part permits this to happen. The state is held to be the source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” The key point to Weber’s musings is to legitimise the violence it must be within “a certain territory”. Today with the globalisation of populations and the use of digital technology the boundaries have become blurred, has the ‘certain territory been extended to those agent’s states can now remotely reach, for instance, targeted assassination. This sends a clear propaganda message to the terrorist groups and individuals, the intended recipients of the deed, the reach of the state is unlimited. If these targeted assassinations are covert, such as the killing of the radical American jihadist Anwar al-Awlaki who was killed by a drone strike in 2011 and was later discussed in congress. The motives of this action were questioned by the Texan representative, Ron Paul, “If the American people accept this blindly and casually, that we now have an accepted practice of the president assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys, I think it’s sad.” However, we could argue this type of questioning is rare and such POTD has often increased public support, for actions against the terrorist groups in retaliation for barbaric acts such as the beheading of hostages.

When states employ POTD they must be aware of a number of critical audiences, and issues such as human rights, which could be interpreted in different ways depending on the individual’s political orientation. Even ‘justified and ‘legal’ actions such as violence and repressions can have a negative on some audience but satisfy others, for example the shoot-to-kill policy of the British in Northern Ireland split opinion. After the recent events in Europe involving suicide and random attack terrorist events, the ‘shoot-to-kill policy returned with the Home Office stating: "Under the Criminal Law Act 1967, the use of force for the prevention of crime and apprehension of offenders and those unlawfully at large must be 'reasonable' in all the circumstances.” (Kelsey, 2015) Public opinion appears to back this legal justification with Rozenberg (2015) commenting “when jihadis set out to murder, a shoot-to-kill policy is the only way to protect us against them.” The British government has recognised the public’s concern with the attacks and psychological strategy of ISIS, by recognizing hostile themes they have used the terrorist deeds to justify their own policies and spread propaganda to justify the killing of terrorists on British soil.

Drones have been employed since the events of 9/11 by the then American President, George Bush, as a ‘defensive weapon’ against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and in the President’s pledge to neutralise Bin Laden. The Americans have often used drones and, according to Becker and Scott (2012), compiled lists of high-value targets for ‘’. These high-profile drone attacks created exciting and stimulating viewing across the globe and were predominantly supported by many in the USA. However, as Cronin comments, these attacks also created “sworn enemies out a sea of local insurgents”. As Sahab, the propaganda branch of Al Qaeda was quick to highlight the ‘collateral damage’ these drones caused and used this as a recruitment tool. Bolt, Betz, and Azari (2008) observe when states use ‘propoganda of the deed it can alienate the native population where the deed has taken place but “states, even democracies, can and do regularly adopt propaganda of the deed as a technique of symbolic action.” What should also be considered, is the impact on the citizens of the home state. As has been recently seen in the battle against ISIS, the use of military drones appears to have increased as has the discussion on the legitimecy of using these weapons outside the aggressors “certain territory”, as described by Weber (1994).

Though it is likely that these drone attacks attract recruits or bolster the resolve of existing members of terrorist organisations, these deeds also play a part in spreading positive propaganda throughout the home countries. “We may assume it might have played positively to broader constituencies ‘back home’ supporting the Coalition forces through tax-pounds (and dollars)” (Bolt, Betz, & Azari, 2008) Not all is lost overseas, with the strategy of ‘hearts and minds’ a portion of the local population can be ‘controlled’ and, with coercion, lessen their support for the terrorist. “In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self–restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.” (Perliger, 2012)

Wootton Bassett the Village that Wept

During the ‘war on terror’ the sleepy village of Wootton Bassett was the chosen venue for reception and military procession of the dead soldiers from overseas conflicts became a means of gaining support for the UK government’s battle and its military. A powerful message was being conveyed through these symbolic displays of military funeral processions, indirectly organized by the government, due to a military runway closure at Brize Norton. The military parades for fallen soldiers from ‘the war on terrorism’, accompanied by families (and eventually large numbers of press and public) were required to pass through the peaceful village in Oxfordshire to reach the special military pathology department at Oxford's John Radcliffe hospital. The village was later described by the The Guardian News Paper as “unorganised” events started to attract more and more members of the public in support against the evils of terrorism. This support grew from the support of a few members of the Royal British Legion when the old soldiers would “salute them [the funeral parade] as they passed through the town." (Gillan, 2010)

In those first days, there was no pavement vigil or saluting or silences: the coffins passed almost unnoticed. One afternoon in summer, local members of the Royal British Legion happened to be on the high street when a union flag-draped coffin caught their eye. "The legion had a meeting," Scott recalls, "and it was decided that we would find out when these soldiers were being repatriated – then we would salute them as they passed through the town." (Gillan, 2010) Later when the original airfield was reopened, the Ministry of Defense told the media "the people of Wootton Bassett had done such a lot to lend their support, it was felt it would be insensitive to transfer the process back to Brize." The support had grown in the fight against terrorism and the positive government propaganda spread via regular articles on the media. The battle for hearts and minds was taking place not in foreign lands but in the United Kingdom.

“A deed is not homogeneous. Instead it is important to recognise that the same deed sends out different messages and divergent objectives, simultaneously to potentially multiple audiences.” (Bolt, Betz, & Azari, 2008) Not all of this ‘hearts and minds’ propaganda was interpreted by the indigenous population as positive, and as Pizzuto further notes: “Governments may suffer from a lack of compatibility with target audiences and may actually offend the audience due to a limited first-hand cultural knowledge,” (Pizzuto, 2013). This was the case in Wootton Bassett where some UK groups, sympathetic with the Muslim populations in the Middle East, seized on the events and arranged a demonstration, ‘deed’, to promote a counter-propaganda narrative to the government. Butt (2010) reported that a “plan by Islam4UK to parade along the town's high street with empty coffins symbolising the Muslim victims of the conflict in Afghanistan has been widely condemned by politicians, civic leaders, and mainstream Muslim groups.” The government were quick to respond and “in a statement, the Prime Minister said the Wiltshire town has assumed a "special significance" in the life of the nation which should be respected.” Propaganda was being spread by the government to counter the possible protests and the media continued to add to the pro-government propaganda by quoting Wootton Bassets Mayor who said: "The people who attend the repatriations no doubt have a wide range of views about the conflicts, but those views are not voiced in our High Street, out of respect to those who have lost their lives and those who grieve for them." (Butt, 2010) The people had risen in support of government propaganda for deeds from the public to support the fight against terrorism.

The Modern Age of Propaganda

The days of the Anarchists has long been assigned to history and with the help of globalisation and the new digital media, the power of the ‘written and spoken word’ cannot be underestimated as the war of words continues with modern terrorist groups. For states, there needs to be a smart strategy capable of quickly evolving to address the current terrorism threat and desired propaganda message. In the late 20^th century, through the media, the “British audiences grew familiar in recent decades with Provisional IRA bombing campaigns” (Bolt, Betz, & Azari, 2008) with Schuurman (2013) suggesting that during the IRA campaign the UK government did not fully recognise the importance of counter-propaganda which could weaken their opponents. One such propaganda disaster was the British policy of internment of suspects which received mixed British public support.

Governments have been slow, in comparison, in adopting a counter-propaganda narrative. There has been a seed change in recent years where ‘spin doctors’ have adopted the strategy of propaganda by deed and the modern mass media has greatly enhanced their spread. The dissemination of the counterterrorist propaganda in itself is not enough and Tures (2016) suggests, in order to sway the public’s opinions towards a policy, the policy must be clearly defined, plausible, able to change personal perceptions and disseminated to the audience. Tugwell (2018) discusses this further suggesting “propaganda must first attract an audience's attention by penetrating the 'absorption screen', a relatively easy task, and that, to be effective, it must then penetrate the 'personality screen.” During the latter process the beliefs, values, attitudes, concepts, expectations, etc. of individuals in the audience relate to the propaganda message, simplify, classify and label it, and produce an opinion.” Then, and only then, will the individual be influenced to action and support the counterterrorist narrative.

Public support in counterterrorist operations is a resource that is divided into at least two categories; those citizens who can be considered supporters of the government, and those who feel represented by the terrorist organizations. An additional problem for states engaged in counterterrorism is they may not be able to gain the necessary legitimacy among their opponents’ constituent base without dangerously undercutting those segments of the population who see the state as an ally and guardian of their particular interests. Pizzuto (2013) explains “Governments generally lack the necessary credibility and compatibility to counter the terrorist’s message,” and “this lack of credibility can easily derail preventive counterterrorism efforts even before they start and may be an insurmountable obstacle.”

This lack of credibility was clearly demonstrated in the American ‘surgical raid’ to ‘detain’ Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. During the operation, Bin Laden was killed, and his body was quickly buried at sea. The propaganda effect of the deed was significant for the American government. Mueller and Stewart (2018) noted that the public’s “confidence in government counterterrorism efforts rose substantially” and the “fears of terrorism subsided at the time, though to a lesser degree. However, any boost in public confidence and decline in fear evaporated within a few months,” (Mueller & Stewart, 2018) as the public doubted the official account of events and if Bin Laden had really been captured or killed.

Hamilton (2018) writes about the recent capture of two of the ‘The Beatles’, British nationals “who took part in the torture and killing of western hostages” in Syria and quotes British officials declaring “their capture a potential “treasure trove” of intelligence that they hope will lead to information”. The capture of these two terrorists is a lesson learnt from the drone ‘targeted assassination’ of ‘Jihadi John’, November 12, 2015 another member of ‘The Beatles’. Controversy surrounded his killing which called into question the legitimacy of using drones over foreign lands for the targeting of British nationals. Negative propaganda in the British media questioned the “legal justification” for such attacks with the joint committee on human rights (JCHR) suggesting such ‘violent deeds’ “exposes frontline personnel and all those involved in decisions to launch lethal attacks outside warzones to “criminal prosecution for murder or complicity in murder”. (Ross, 2016) American policy makers have made the same propaganda errors, with observers noting that “National Strategy for Counterterrorism promotes human rights and the rule of law, but the United States uses drones to kill terrorists.” (Pizzuto, 2013) These actions have allowed groups such as Al Qaeda to promote counter propaganda by exploiting “these events to extend the opinion that the United States is anti-Muslim, thereby increasing the void between the U.S. government and the Muslim community.” (Pizzuto, 2013)

The ‘Jihadi John’ incident forced a review of government policy as ‘targeted assassination’ of UK subjects gave rise to the outcry of both the public and human rights organisations; they supported to capture and trial of British Terrorists; some relatives of terrorist victims commenting that the “rules of engagement on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria authorised the killing of terrorists, but once captured they must answer and be judged to a legitimate authority”. (Hamilton, 2018) A number of relatives of the victims who condoned the use of illicit means for dealing with these individuals implied there could be some flexibility and prolific media coverage of these views implied that public influence may have leverage in state deeds, that there were options. The UK state reaction clearly spells out that these terrorists would be subject to normal legal policies and procedures. However, it was recently reported that the US and UK are talking about the fate of the duo ‘The Beatles’ indicating that there are options for more forceful and severe action, a daughter of one of the victims said “she wished they died a slow and painful death as she spoke of her relief that two of its members [Beatles]” had been captured. It is possible that if it were to come to light that any state response included killing the perpetrators when the hostages were already dead or other such unethical deeds there would be fewer repercussions as public support has grown to use mercenary type action.

Conclusion

Counterterrorism activity can often be described as POTD, whether the symbolic action is violent or not. For states, the management of the public’s awareness has always been an important element of winning ‘wars’, and the war against terrorism is no different. The new media have heralded a need for states to change how they traditionally handled propaganda and the actions are taken to win ‘hearts and minds’. Democratic states have used the terrorists POTD we see today to legitimise and justify their own version of the POTD, perhaps influenced by an increase in public support, after all, it is only states who have the legitimate use of violence.

As with terrorism, counterterrorism is now asymmetric and uses propaganda as one of its main weapons in the message will struggle to gain support from all audiences. While the “The grist for the terrorists' propaganda mill is always provided by blunders of policy or execution, by poorly briefed soldiers or policemen and by nonsensical, aggravating procedures”, (Tugwell, 2018) the state must be proactive and negate any possible negative propaganda through poor execution of the deed and by controlling and disciplining any suspected of taking unwarranted and unauthorised physical actions against terrorist targets. Through careful use of symbolic acts and media, states’ can, and have, gained the upper hand, rallying support from target audiences, whilst at the same time threatening the very survival of the terrorist group. The benefit of a particular deed can be short-lived as the propaganda war rocks back and forth.

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