Missed Opportunities

Missed Opportunities for Harvesting Intelligence

This evidence of criminal activity and missed opportunities reinforces the hypothesis that there are intelligence opportunities pre-attack and that, due to the nature of offences FORINT strategies could help identify these future terrorists. McGarrell et al. (2007) contemplated that intelligence should target criminal groups and ‘complex organisations as ‘a clear pattern of precursor activity across diverse terrorist organizations are discovered. They discovered that ‘all terrorist organizations require money, material, transportation, identity papers, communication systems, and safe havens to accomplish their aims. Crimes to finance these operations should be the top priority for investigators.' If criminal activity is suspected or detected, there should be ample opportunity to harvest numerous evidence types to produce FORINT from the various scenes required to carry out such activities.

Knowledge of how these individuals or groups operate in the build-up to terrorism can help target criminal intelligence collection methods and counter risks and threats before they translate into a terrorist or serious crime problem. FORINT can assist in pre-crime interventions where intelligence links ‘substantial and continuing coercive action to suspicion without the need for evidence, charge and conviction. Other measures, such as the criminalization of association and ‘ preparatory ’offences, are pre-crimes that expand the remit of the criminal law by fulfilling the demand for security that ‘ dictates earlier and earlier intervention to reduce opportunity.’ (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009) In pre-crime intervention, the intention is to use intelligence proactively and encourage the subjects to disengage from a violent future. Bjørgo (2015) suggests that by making the activity and progression to crime, or terrorism, uncomfortable and unattractive in a social context offering a ‘carrot’ of release can be offered which could deter them from crime.

In a study of a 2003 terrorist attack in Istanbul, intelligence opportunities were squandered. The criminal investigation uncovered numerous missed opportunities where intelligence could have identified the four ‘suicide bombers' in the planning stage. The prospects for gathering intelligence, including FORINT, was with ‘250 community members who were not ideologically committed to al-Qaeda’s goals and who had some information that potentially could have been used in preventive action’ (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). Other items were available for forensic examination including, explosives, mobile phones, counterfeited passports and drivers’ licenses. Due to the number of the community involved some will have had suspicions or knowledge of the planning; the FORINT which is likely to have been gathered from the recovered items, had opportunities been exploited would have gleaned proactive intelligence, possibly preventing the attack