In the aftermath of 9/11, it was widely expected that terrorists would take to the sea, and that the maritime sector would have to face a wave of maritime terrorism. However, very few attacks have occurred so far. Why?

Introduction

On 11th September 2001, in a well-planned and orchestrated attack, four-passenger airliners bound for California were hijacked by nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists. Spectacularly deviating from the previous terrorist tactic of ‘hijack and ransom’, the aircraft, piloted by the terrorists on suicide missions were used as ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD). The attack provided al-Qaeda with global media attention causing mass casualties and unimaginable destruction. What followed was the declaration by President Bush’s Administration to fight a ‘War on Terror’.

The realisation after 9/11 was that the ‘new terrorist' was capable of the unthinkable, but the idea to use an aircraft for suicide missions was not new. In 1999 a RAND Corporation report for the United States Airforce, "Countering the New Terrorism", discussed the changing security environment. Recent events and ‘new terrorist' tactics including the attacks on the US embassies of Kenya and Tanzania, the Oklahoma City Federal buildings and suicide attacks in Israel were discussed; significantly the report noted that terrorists had "plotted to crash a hijacked airliner into a city". (Lessor et al., 1999) The report also noted that terrorists had made similarly spectacular plots to that of 9/11, including a scheme that "attempted to beach an explosives-laden boat in Israel in an effort to kill hundreds of swimmers, and deranged individuals have threatened to use biological and nuclear weapon[s]." (Lessor et al, 1999)

This essay will discuss the reasons why terrorist groups do not appear to be substantially engaging in any form of maritime terrorism.

Definitions

The maritime environment has long been a stage for nations to battle and rule, and pirates to strike fear into the hearts of merchants and seafarers. Today this situation remains much the same, though without the major sea battles. Piracy is still an irritation for nations, but they now share the waters with drug smugglers, human traffickers and very occasionally with terrorists. In recent years the news has been scattered with reports of modern-day piracy on the high seas, notably in Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Aden off the shores of Somalia. Piracy and maritime terrorism require the same skills; it is the motivating factors that differentiate them. Gawliczek & Nowakowska-Krystman (2016, p.178) note that terrorist groups and individuals are motivated by "religion and politics and in the case of piracy by poverty, [and] the traditions of the sea".

In defining Maritime Terrorism, this essay will utilise the Global Terrorism Database (START) definition as data has been utilised from this source. Therefore, the working definition of Terrorism and Maritime incidents are:

Terrorism is defined as: “a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non - state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. Additionally, the incident must include all of the following:

• “Be intentional, the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator”.

• “Entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, including property violence, as well as violence against people”.

• “The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.”

Furthermore, for a maritime incident “at least two of the following three criteria must be present”:

• “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.”

• “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.”

• “The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.”

The definition of a Maritime event: “Includes civilian maritime: attacks against fishing ships, oil tankers, ferries, yachts, etc.” (START, 2016)

Background

In the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers, there was an explosion of literature on terrorism and the next possible threats. Concern grew that the ‘New Terrorist’ desired increasingly dramatic and spectacular events, involving planning procurement and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As Murphy (2008, p.369) describes the threat, by “using large ships such as LNG carriers, [or] the use of containers to deliver weapons of mass destruction (the “bomb-in-a-box” threat)”. By hijacking a tanker, planting a timed device on-board or even ramming other ships the potential to create a devastating explosion was obvious.

In 2003, academics concurred with some of the views of senior military naval officers, including Admiral Sir Alan West, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, Royal Navy. He commented that “in an era where the maritime terrorist threat is a clear and present danger”, he was concerned that the Royal Navy was “overstretched to provide escorts for looking after high-value units and shipping.” (Rayment, 2003)

Target rich opportunities have forever been available for the terrorist on land, sea and air. Land-based targets have been the main focus of terrorists as they are far more accessible than equivalent air and sea options. Historically, terrorist groups have had an almost obsessive compulsion with planning to destroy airliners. This is somewhat understandable as, with ‘air disasters', the incidents capture an enormous global media audience due to the impact, death and mass destruction as well as political and financial consequences. Maritime events do not attract the same responses.

With water covering 71% of the earth's surface, the oceans provide major trade routes, oil and gas resources as well as fishing grounds and leisure opportunities. The majority of the targets could be defined as ‘soft targets', with weak security often falling outside of the protection of territorial waters. According to the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database (GTB), (Table.1) from 2000 to 2016, there were 100,586 incidents of terrorism, with 344 (0.34%) incidents attributed to airport and aircraft, even less with a maritime theme, 128 (0.13%). This data evidences that land-based attacks compose the majority of targets. It is not surprising that the security-hardened air targets are particularly low, what is challenging to understand is the meagre number of maritime attacks.

Law and Security Cooperation

Safe passage of maritime traffic is in the interest of most states, and the maritime terrorist threat was thought to be credible and imminent. To mitigate the risk, a number of states formed collaborative organisations to enact international agreements and legislation, the goals were to protect maritime interests and prevent possible attacks. One such agreement was negotiated after three difficult years, in 2005, International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed, and was ratified by 145-member states, the SUA Protocol. The ‘Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ was aimed at addressing the “threat of maritime terrorism and the illicit transport of WMD by sea. In addition, it creates a new offence for the illegal transport of fugitives by sea who are accused of violating any of the UN terrorism conventions.” (Herbert-Burns et al, 2009, pp.197-198) Today co-operation is greatly improved, but further work would be beneficial, Hofmeister & Rueppel commenting ( 2014, p.47) that the threat is still much present and “the EU and its Asian partners should increase their dialogue on and practical cooperation in maritime security issues such as piracy, organised crime, and terrorism, and their root causes.”

Over the past decade there has been an increased presence of maritime military assets in piracy hotspots such as the Malacca Straits, South China Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This presence has been escalated due to factors including support of operations relating to the instability in the Middle East and Africa and, directly or indirectly, a reaction to an increase in piracy. Warships, maritime patrol aircraft and surveillance platforms from the European Union, NATO, China, Russia and India have been patrolling the world’s oceans in support of the protection of maritime traffic from piracy, and to a lesser degree terrorism. “The agreement between India, Japan and China aiming at coordinating maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Aden in order to avoid duplications of effort and to act more professionally is one side of the coin, the encouraging one.” (Hofmeister & Rueppel, 2014, p. 29) This international cooperation and other proactive collaborations have undoubtedly had an impact on the pirate’s ability to operate within the patrol areas. The effect has also been beneficial to deter and combat maritime terrorists, as Brian Jenkins noted, “while we should not take piracy as a marker for terrorism, it is a useful indication of the level of security...whatever means [are used] to suppress piracy will have a “knock-on” effect of making the operating environment more difficult for terrorists.” (Murphy, 2008, p.411)

Maritime Terrorism and Piracy

Piracy and maritime terrorism have much in common, but with the differences in motivation, the two groups are unlikely to cooperate or collaborate because of the acute divergence of the desired outcomes. This is not to say that piracy and maritime terrorism have never been combined; a successful example being the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE, a Sri Lankan terrorist group carried out both, acts of terrorism and piracy to support their opposition to government policies. The LTTE had both surface ships (cargo and military) as well as a mini-submarine capability (Tng, 2013, p.9).

In the intervening years between Admiral Sir Alan West’s comments and the present day, the number of maritime terrorism events has stayed below double figures, only broken by a slight increase in 2008 attributed to the LTTE, until 2016 where a sharp increase in South East Asia was chiefly attributed to the ASG. It is yet to be established if maritime terrorism attacks or groups using maritime terrorism will increase in the future or, as, to date a small number who use the maritime assets from necessity will remain the key actors.

The Difference between Success and Failure

Terrorism experts generally agree that the maritime environment is occupied by iconic and vulnerable targets which, if attacked, could hypothetically generate a spectacle for the hungry global media. Most terrorist groups have a desire to commit such memorable attacks, however, for successful outcomes in all environments, land, air and sea, resources are essential; for maritime terrorism, competencies to master the challenges of the sea are rarer and more difficult to attain. With all of its resources and expertise to attack land and air targets, al-Qaeda has so far failed to engage in an extended maritime campaign. Al-Qaeda were known to have had a desire to attack maritime targets and with occasional successes, notably with the attack on the USS Cole.

Powerful and resourceful land based terrorist groups did not ordinarily have all the ingredients needed for successful maritime terrorist outcomes. The LTTE and their Sea Tigers, until their defeat in 2009 had efficient and deadly maritime capability to take the fight directly to the Sri Lankan navy. Murphy’s (2007, Loc.1714) study of what makes a terrorist group successful in the maritime theatre, contends there are seven factors featured in groups exploiting the sea. Murphy describes these as:

1. Legal and jurisdictional weakness

2. Geographic necessity

3. Inadequate security

4. Secure base areas

5. Maritime tradition

6. Charismatic and effective leadership

7. State support

If, as Murphy (2007) suggests, these factors are crucial for a group to be successful, it is indeed a challenging formula to fulfil, the majority of the factors may offer some degree of success, but factors such as having state support, geographic location and maritime tradition are difficult to achieve and are generally outside of the groups’ control, they are in the hands of fate and circumstance.

Other factors likely to glean successful outcomes are interrelated, for example, a weak state or government, state support, inadequate legislation and jurisdiction are likely to result in regions with inadequate security provisions. Failed countries, or countries with insufficient security, can offer terrorist groups safe areas of operation, and land bases where the government cannot combat the terrorist group effectively. For example, in the early 2000s al-Qaeda was operating in Yemen, where Terrill (2013) noted, they “re-grouped” after their defeat in Saudi Arabia. Off the coast of Yemen, al-Qaeda carried out an unsuccessful attack on the USS The Sullivans and a successful attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the French-flagged tanker, MV Limburg in 2002. Soon after the attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. and Yemini government’s cooperated to combat the presence of al-Qaeda in Yemen, eventually severely limiting the group's effectiveness in that country.

According to Anzinger (2014), “Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method.” The ‘alleged’ leader and architect of the attacks, Abd al- Rahim al-Nashiri, nicknamed “the Prince of the Sea”, had “learned boat-handling and other skills from seafarers in western Yemen.” With these seafaring skills, he adopted the tactics of the successful LTTE Sea Tigers. Though the attacks were successful in attracting global media attention, the results were far from spectacular, and both the USS Cole and MV Limberg were repaired. The result of these attacks cost al-Qaeda a unique and valuable member of its leadership, al-Nashiri, and the arrest of another thirteen individuals implicated in the plots, a high price to pay. After the detention of al-Nashiri in 2002, there have been no successful maritime attacks by al-Qaeda, though allegedly, plots have been discovered and foiled by security services.

Though al-Qaeda is eminently capable of successfully developing and enacting plans to attack land-based targets, they lack at least factors of effective maritime leadership and maritime tradition. To date, it does not appear as if al-Nashiri has been replaced or suitable persons with the maritime profile identified so we can only hope Murphy (2007, Loc.1702) is correct when he suggests, “groups that have lacked these kinds of practical imperatives have generally abandoned their maritime activities”.

Tactics

The challenge for counter-terrorism agencies is to pre-empt counter-terrorist tactics, while the terrorist endeavours to achieve the same through asymmetry. Asymmetry of tactics and operations in any arena is important, and the Terrorists must develop new ideas and solutions if they are to be successful. Concerning attack strategies, Gawliczek & Nowakowska-Krystman (2016, p.178) suggest that the security services find it difficult to counter audacious, irregular attack strategies.' An example of this was the development of the swarm attacks by the LTTE, exemplify this. However, the Sri Lanka navy ultimately developed tactics to thwart them rendering the tactic useless. This is an issue with many groups' psyche because as Peter Lehr argues "that terrorist groups are operationally conservative, and are prone to copying tactics and targets that have worked in the past." (Asal & Hastings, 2014). Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan, who was the head of the LTTE Sea Tigers till his death in 2009, further adds evidence for Lehr’s conclusion; boasting the al-Qaeda suicide attack on the USS Cole “had been copied from the Tigers.” (Waldman, 2003) Gawliczek & Nowakowska-Krystman, (2016, pp.179) state, "reproduction of knowledge, its imitation by others, results in loss of advantage", and a necessity for the group to use radical tactics to be successful. Therefore, groups lacking maritime experience and tradition fare poorly in carrying out ‘copy’ attacks which could be easily countered.

Seamanship Skills

Operating beyond the calm waters of the shore requires personnel who are trained in seamanship and have the knowledge and skills to competently fulfil the roles successfully. These skills are rare in many terrorist organisations that are traditionally landlocked, others including LTTE Sea Tigers and Abu Sayyaf (ASG) have supporters with long-standing maritime traditions and seafaring communities. In both organisations, the use of the sea has been a necessary action as, originating from an island or archipelago, the options of operating entirely on land was not an option, as suggested by Murphy's (2007) ‘geographic necessity.'

The group's long-held core skills were suited to their traditional and natural working environment in fishing as well as illegal maritime activity such as human trafficking, smuggling, opportunistic piracy and maritime terrorism. The LTTE Sea Tigers were very effective between 1988-2009 when their group was defeated by the Sri Lankan government, and more recently, the ASG in the Philippines from 2000 to the present. Even combined, the GTD records only 44 terrorist incidents from 1988 to the present. Maritime centric groups have exploited their skills and knowledge of boat building, sailing and working at sea while other groups have remained firmly on the land. Skills could be learnt, and resources appropriated, however, substantial time and effort which could be expended in familiar environments and habitual targets were much more likely to be successful.

Natural Disasters

The world’s seas and oceans offer some of the most rapidly changing and extreme environments capable of making large tankers disappear and therefore extremely dangerous places for any mariner to operate in. The tsunami of 2004 shocked the world with the devastation and death throughout the coastal areas of the Indian Ocean, the tidal waves shattered lives and destroyed large areas of land. On the rim of the Indian Ocean, both the LTTE and GAM’s resources were severely affected, but the outcomes were very different. The GAM soon entered into a ceasefire and discussions with the government negotiating with multiple parties to end hostilities. Conversely. “when the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, the LTTE were two years into a tenuous ceasefire with the government. But they were busy re-arming for a fight that would erupt into the decisive phase of the long-running civil war in late July 2006.” (Tarrant & Hull, 2009) The LTTE and the Sea Tigers restored hostilities, but their dated tactics were countered and their force crushed by 2009 after losing their safe land bases.

The GTD data provides evidence that the majority of terrorist groups don’t employ the seas to launch terror attacks, but there is evidence that groups use maritime assets for “logistical and transportation support, enabling them to acquire supplies and access areas they would otherwise have been denied without access to the sea.” (Asal & Hastings, 2014). This movement of supplies on the seas is normally, but not always, due to geographical necessity, or, as Asal and Hastings suggest it allows groups “to acquire supplies and access areas they would otherwise have been denied.” Necessity is often the ‘mother of invention’, if there are easier opportunities and methods then the more familiar route is usually selected.

Conclusion

After the events of 9/11, the threat of maritime terrorism became the subject of much speculation for security experts though these prophecies have so far not materialised. The GTD data provides evidence that maritime attacks account for just over 0.1% of all terrorist events since 2000 even with the apparent rich target landscape.

In theory, attacking maritime targets is a real possibility for many of today’s established terror groups, but this rarely occurs. The reason for this, Chalk (2008, p.19) suggest, is that “terrorists are inherently conservative when it comes to choosing attack modalities.” Combined with this, land-centric groups do not naturally possess the required competencies and specialist resources required to launch speculative maritime attacks. Finances and resources are likely to be limited and so groups, preferring to use their experience and knowledge, use tactics and methods they are conversant with, in familiar theatres, where success is most assured and media attention guaranteed.

We can only surmise what the future might hold, history suggests that the maritime threat has been overestimated. The current cooperation between states to patrol and police piracy hotspots must have had an impact on the decisions made by some groups to pursue maritime activities in those regions. That is not to say that groups do not use the sea for illicit activities, there is evidence of smuggling and trafficking, and piracy to gain resources and finance. This is probably the limit of many groups maritime aspirations, a means to support the primary business of land centric terrorism.

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