Q1: How has UK Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) been developed?

Q2: What are the challenges of absorbing Criminalistics Forensic Intelligence into ILP.

Introduction

This literature research aims to investigate:

Q1. How has Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) been Developed in the U.K.?

Q2. What are the Challenges of Absorbing Criminalistic Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) into ILP?

Identifying research data related to this unique question presented some challenges with few relevant research papers identified. Specific literature on criminalistic forensics is challenging to find both in hard and soft copy; no literature identified unequivocally encompassed the area of research. It was, therefore, necessary to broaden the question to include the development of the overarching intelligence model, ILP, to understand why there are knowledge gaps and an apparent lack of inclusion of FORINT within ILP. This situation may stem from the fact that both the police and security services have limited awareness of forensic processes, its realities and more importantly how it can be used proactively within ILP to combat crime and terrorism.

Police have used Criminalistic forensics across the globe for many years; being employed in collaboration with traditional policing methods to provide supporting evidence to combat criminality and provide supporting evidence for law court. Raymond & Julian (2015, p. 374) describe FORINT, which includes criminalistic forensics, as an ‘additional ‘type' of emerging intelligence which should be ‘the accurate, timely and useful product of logically processing (analysis of) forensic case data (information) for investigation and/or intelligence purposes.’ Though criminalistic forensic evidence offers valuable corroboration to either confirm or refute accusations and charges by helping convey a forensic story given a specific incident and circumstances. Unfortunately, this valuable source of forensics gathered from scene examinations and suspects is typically consumed by law enforcement only as reactive evidence. Criminalistic forensics aids barristers, juries and court officials in judgements to decide, guilt or innocence.

Gathering large amounts of criminalistic forensics evidence produces, not only large quantities of actionable evidence, for example, fingerprints found at scenes, but also the possibility to provide FORINT, potentially useful in the 'deterrence and reduction of crime' (Almog, 2014) including major crime and terrorism. It is therefore puzzling why the value and relevance of criminalistic FORINT have not been recognised for its potential by law enforcement agencies in the U.K. and worldwide.

The use of Intelligence by the military is nothing new; however, for the police, it could be argued it has taken many years to develop and is still in in its relative infancy. As we will see, crime intelligence was identified by Patrick Colquhoun (1800) in the 18^th century as an important constituent of policing; one could argue that significant changes in the way the U.K. treats crime intelligence, especially FORINT, has changed very little from Colquhoun's first musing.

Literature Search and Selection

Methodology

The author, having over forty years' experience in military and policing Intelligence, including 30 years in crime scene investigation, quickly identified that, having subject knowledge greatly assisted in the identification of relevant articles through a coding paradigm as the author ‘was sensitised to those aspects of the data that are considered to be essential' (McGraw-Hill Education, 2019).

With this knowledge and experience, by using an interpretive method for the literature research recognises that the researcher and the subject are inherently associated which may influence the literature research process. For the research process to be of value in academia, the researcher must maintain objectivity and aspire to be as objective and honest as is possible, failure to fulfil this criterion will make the research and findings invalid and irrelevant. The responsibility for the reliability and validity ultimately falls to the researchers, as Stake (1994) stated ‘criteria of representation ultimately are decided by the researcher’, and, I would respectfully suggest, the researcher’s peers.

This literature review is limited to exploiting open-source methods and channels, identifying and gathering qualitative information and data from reports, academic research papers and official documents, not original current data. James (2011), a leading academic in the field of policing and Intelligence, emphasises that the use of qualitative research has been had substantial influence in the area of policing and criminal intelligence many times though some academics would argue otherwise.

The literature search for relevant and current academic articles and papers on criminalistic FORINT presents challenges owing to the sensitive and specialist nature of the subject matter, and arguably the lack of appropriate available data and crime statistics. There is also an overriding requirement to keep the information, including processes and policies, confidential and out of the public domain, mainly where the public, and national security is concerned. Unfortunately, policing and military 'need-to-know’ culture takes presidency and appears to stifle tends to suppress research on sensitive Intelligence practises, which in turn will repress academic research and subject understanding and progress.

This 'need-to-know' culture is rampant with intelligence operatives and is accurate where the subject of FORINT intersects with major crime and terrorism. Paradoxically, McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007) when researching ILP and Terrorism in the USA and UK, retrieved a modest quantity of empirical research around the subject of law enforcement intelligence and counterterrorism policies and strategies. During the systematic review of articles published from the early 1970s to the early 2000's McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007, p. 147) disclosed that only three percent of the articles were empiric and only seven of those articles comprised of ‘moderately rigorous evaluations of counterterrorism programs’. They further concluded; 'little has been written about the effectiveness of law enforcement strategies in responding to terrorist events.’ Unfortunately, it would appear this situation holds today as, during this literature search, of the three hundred plus articles reviewed, none were found that explicitly covered the area of research.

The subject of criminalistic FORINT is incredibly complicated to comprehensively research in mainstream academia due to the nature of the subject and the gap of appropriate publicly available data and information. With little research being carried out, it follows that criminalistic FORINT has not been comprehensively studied, and realistically explained in the literature available on policing and Military Intelligence.

The intention and outcome of any research must be carefully considered as, with any academic research, it is crucial to marry the research subject with the appropriate methods, and epistemological principles as these will generate the research outcomes. The subject of Intelligence is weighed heavily on the actions of the practitioners involved in its processes and therefore understanding how these people experience life and work and interpret their surroundings and environments involves social analysis. In this instance, qualitative research suits this form of social enquiry as it endeavours to cognise the realities of the subject under research. By exploiting grounded theory and qualitative methods, this research will seek to identify the challenges in the interaction and social processes within intelligence communities and if this negatively affects the effectiveness of the ‘intelligence machine’.

Literature Selection

As discussed above, the identification and assessment of relevant academic materials and reports have been challenging due to the U.K. authorities finding it necessary to keep certain details out of the public domain to support national security, as illustrated with the recently proposed Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS). This bill supports the ‘criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources, for the prevention and detection of crime or of preventing disorder, national security, or for the economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ (Parliament Publications, 2020). This is relevant as there is evidence that the security of Intelligence and FORINT is at risk of being exploited or misunderstood in the public domain, as research by Fedorek (2013, p. 4) discovered; 'crime-related television viewing was statistically significant in influencing perceptions of forensic evidence and fear of crime’.

Therefore, the authorities ‘need-to-know’ policy keeps information from the public domain and could be argued, safeguards the effectiveness of intelligence. This situation arguably impacts the culture within the policing intelligence community and adoption of an entrenched culture of ‘dare to share' and ‘need to know'; ‘intelligence ‘practitioners are all too aware of the need to keep some techniques secret, or at least the methodology used in those techniques’ (Buckley, 2014).

Categories and Coding

The professional knowledge and experience of the researcher within FORINT have allowed simple identification and recognition of jargon, terminology, terms and practises, which were similar across organisations and placed them into the context of the research. For example, the definitions of Intelligence, and FORINT, differ significantly within organisations within the U.K., as is the case with terrorism, the definition of Intelligence can include or exclude specific contextual Intelligence depending on its relevance.

Identifying keywords and text strings was established by examining known, relevant academic and official report texts available from open sources on the internet. The search was performed on numerous internet search engines as individual engines execute searches differently, and ' our heavy reliance on search engines as a means of coping with the Web’s size and growth does affect how we discover, visit, and link pages’ (Topical interests and the mitigation of search engine bias, 2006, p. 12687) and are geographically and language biased. Thus far, the searches have identified over 300 documents that discuss policing or military Intelligence and FORINT in one of its numerous forms.

Literature Review

Q1: How has UK Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) been developed?

Crime Intelligence in a Historical Perspective.

The gathering of crime intelligence is far from being a recent innovation. As early as the 18 Century, Patrick Colquhoun (1800), a leading contemporary academic and future Superintending Magistrate of policing in England discussed in his Treatise, ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis', about the importance of ILP. Colquhoun (1800) believed that Intelligence could be an essential tool for police managers to assist in setting objectives and directing police resources to combat crime. He mused that persons should be dedicated to the intelligence function if it was to be successful. ‘Clerks might be continually employed with great advantage in entering and posting up under the proper heads, such new information as should be obtained from day to day; and hours should be appointed for receiving such intelligence from all proper and well-informed persons, who might choose to offer the same; so far as such information related to Public wrongs, and offences against the peace, safety, and well-being of Society.’ (Colquhoun, 1800, p. 521) He further suggested that a central body should collate crime intelligence, the 'Board', where personnel would be well placed to analyse the information and ‘adopt measures for preventing the growing corruption of Morals, by which every species of delinquency is generated’ (Colquhoun, 1800, p. 548).

At this early stage in the development of a policing intelligence function, Colquhoun offered examples of successful use of Intelligence in the prevention of crime, albeit from the French police. The Minister of Police in Paris, Monsieur De Sartine had developed a police intelligence system in order to preserve the safety of the Parisian citizens. On one such occasion, intelligence was gathered about the planned robbery of a wealthy foreign merchant who was visiting Paris for business. The gathered Intelligence proved decisive: 'the consequence was, that the perpetration of the atrocious deed was prevented, and sufficient evidence obtained to convict the offenders. Monsieur De Sartine’s Intelligence enabled prevention of this horrible offence of robbery and murder, which, but for the accuracy of the system, would probably have progressed to execution' (Colquhoun, 1800, p. 528). The timely and comprehensive intelligence gathering allowed the police to intervene in the robbery preventing the murder of the merchant.

In the late 1700s, the use of police intelligence was not limited to local or national Intelligence. Colquhoun (1800) quotes another instance of criminal intelligence having an international context. Emperor Joseph the second of Austria, in 1787, approached the King of France demanding that an Austrian subject of the Emperor be returned from Paris, where the Austrian authorities had traced him, to Vienna. The ‘offender’, a notoriously violent criminal, was to be tried in Austria for his crimes, but first, he had to be located and captured. Again, the Police intelligence apparatus of Monsieur De Sartine was put to task and summoned to the Austrian Ambassador. Sartine acknowledged to the Ambassador that the subject had been in Paris and gave details of his movements, though Sartine explained, the subject had now left Paris. The Ambassador insisted the Austrian Intelligence had affirmed the subject was still in Paris and that Sartine must be incorrect, Sartine assured the Ambassador he was not mistaken. During the exchange, the Minister of Police in Paris explained ‘Do me the honour, Sir, to inform the Emperor, your Master, that the person he looks for left Paris on the 10th day of the last month; and is now lodged in a back room looking into a garden in the third story of a house, number 93, in —— street, in his own Capital of Vienna; where his Majesty will, by sending to the spot, be sure to find him.’ (Colquhoun, 1800, p. 529). Checks in Vienna proved that the subject was located precisely where Sartine had him located.

At this time, the French Police intelligence system was recognised, at least by Colquhoun (1800), as being one of the best organised and of the ‘greatest degree of perfection’. Though considered as one of the best intelligence systems of its time, there was a realisation that this system may not suit English policing. There were inconsistencies between the aims and desired outcomes of the Intelligence, current laws and even considerations of human rights; 'even to extend and increase the Liberty of Subject without taking one privilege away; or interfering in the pursuits of any one class of individuals; except those employed in purposes of mischief, fraud, and criminality’ Colquhoun (1800, p. 525). Even at this early stage, Colquhoun considered the importance of crime intelligence could not be overlooked. He recommended adopting a system in England loosely based on the French system; noting that police intelligence could be collected, collated and exploited within the constraints of the English 18c society and policing while considering the ‘subject’ of the intelligence freedoms, and more importantly, safekeeping the peace and security of the more significant law-abiding public.

The benefits of gathering crime intelligence have barely changed over the centuries, though methods of collection and technology have changed way beyond what Colquhoun would have recognised. Globalisation has played a major role in aiding major and transnational crime and transnational terrorism where international travel and communication is virtually unrestricted. This unrestricted use of travel and new media have combined to allow criminals and terrorists to exploit mass media live public broadcasts, communication systems, GPS, smartphones and the internet to plan, choreograph and execute ‘a live show, which could be seen stage by stage, much like a prepared script’ (Shpiro, 2002), events from which timely intelligence will have been available if the indicators were identified and acted upon. As the Irish Republican Army (IRA) claimed responsibility for the Brighton Hotel Bombing in 1984 which failed to kill the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, the IRA press release threatened; ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always’ (Taylor, 2001).

ILP in a Historical Perspective.

ILP in the 20^th century

It could be argued that, from the inception of the U.K. police forces, as described by Colquhoun (1800), there was little change until late in the century, when, in 1883 the Metropolitan Police created the Special Irish Branch which was formed to address the terrorist threat on the British mainland from the IRA. This specialist branch was explicitly tasked with gathering intelligence on and arresting, terrorist actors and the 'enemies' of the United Kingdom. This function stayed with the Special Irish Branch until the 1960s when the function of mainstream intelligence function was extended to mainstream policing, and it was a further 30 years before ILP would officially become the jurisdiction of the police.

ILP Experience in the U.K.

The realisation that forensic science and its’ Intelligence was identified as being critical after the intelligence failures during several high-profile cases and especially the Yorkshire Ripper murders, Peter Sutcliffe, which occurred between 1975 and 1980 in the North of England. ‘In major crime investigations, especially series, where detection of the individual case is deemed to be of critical importance, forensic science resources are drawn on relatively liberally according to specific needs as they are seen to arise (Tilly & Townsley, 2009). Tilly and Townsley (2009) discuss the importance of FORINT and the roles that the Crime Scene Investigators and forensic scientists play.

During the Ripper enquiry, which took place over several policing geographical areas, the crossflow of Intelligence was remarkably low, meaning essential intelligence, both crime and forensic, was not compiled and relayed to relevant authorities. It is argued that this lack of communication allowed Sutcliffe to commit more crimes and murder his victims. Sir Lawrence Byford (2006), who led the inquiry into these failures, noted that forensic resources play a major part in major crime investigation; he identified the requirement of a forensic scientist, with an overall view of the investigation, to liaise with the investigation team. The ‘Byford Scientist’ as they were to become known ‘describes a development in the interface between specialist advisors and crime investigators, bringing scientific techniques and reasoning to the collection and interpretation of physical evidence. The use of Byford scientists addresses a weakness in the way in which this interface had been working previously in major crime investigation. It represents, thus, one effort to rationalise the use of forensic science’ (Tilly & Townsley, 2009).

The conversations around the use of FORINT continued in the mid-nineteen eighties where Vogel and Legrand (2014) discussed the work of John Birkett, a member of the Forensic Science Society, discussed forensics intelligence where he considered that forensic data and Intelligence could be indexed from crime scenes to help link crime scenes and identification of suspects. In 1999 that Ribaux and Margot (1999) expanded on the concepts discussed by Birkett. Ribaux and Margot theorised that FORINT had more to offer than a reactive input to criminal cases forensic data and Intelligence be proactive; ‘the study of inferences drawn by investigators during problem-solving is a useful approach to analyse how forensic science data should be integrated into criminal intelligence.'

In the 1990s Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) and U.K. Audit Commission, acknowledged a crucial obligation of the U.K. Police should be, to develop a proactive strategy to combat crime. This strategy would be required to deploy resources more effectively as the demands on policing were being surpassed by the police's ability to control a rising crime rate. By 1997 the HMIC suggested that prolific and reoffending criminals should be targeted by developing intelligence products for these individuals with use of informants and surveillance techniques. The U.K. Audit Commission importantly recognised that criminalistics forensics had a critical part to play in their strategy, principally biometrics, which ‘could be used as both an identifier and an information source’ (Raymond & Julian, 2015, p. 372).

It was Kent and later Northumbria Police who first implemented a form of ILP though it remained disjointed from traditional policing and made little impact until the events of 9/11. ‘As evident in the U.K. experience, the adoption of ILP did not arise solely from the concern with terrorism but rather builds on major developments in law enforcement that emerged in the past two decades of the 20th century’ (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007, p. 8). If the FORINT process was embraced and appreciated by law enforcement agencies, it would allow for judicious collection, analysis and dissemination of timely intelligence and better facilitate the identification and proactive targeting of offenders and suspects and the ‘calculated and purposeful allocation is believed to make the best use of the limited resources at hand' (Weston, 2015, p. 8).

Q2. What are the challenges of absorbing Criminalistics FORINT into ILP?

Intelligence-Led Policing

Since the inception of ILP, there has been broad adoption of the strategy into the processes of U.K. police forces. The overall ambition of the strategy was to encourage a 'collaborative enforcement approach combining problem-solving, information sharing and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations. With a focus on gathering, compiling, and analysing data to inform decision making' (Ribaux & Caneppele, 2018). U.K. police, and the security apparatus that surrounds it, generally use three categories to describe operational policing tasking and intelligence; 'Operational, Tactical and Strategic' (National Crime Agency, 2019). The goal of ILM was to fulfil the requirements of the HMIC and U.K. Audit Commission, namely, reduce and prevent crime. It was recognised that for ILP to be successful all the diverse sources of intelligence must be absorbed into the process and analysed promptly if this essential requirement is not met the intelligence becomes reactive, only available after the incident. Reactive, or untimely intelligence, should not be disregarded and consigned to the digital filing cabinet as it can inform longer-term policing challenges. FORINT is often ‘late to the party’ as traditional policing methods are often the cultural norm, though Ribaux and Caneppele (2018) argue that forensic examinations, outcomes and intelligence when combined with ILP in a mutually beneficial analysis will empower ILP.

Unfortunately, intelligence sources appear to be isolated and irrelevant intelligence, which would not match the stringent or ‘current’ intelligence requirements of the major crime and counterterrorist organisations and judiciary, however, when viewed in context, adds knowledge to the overall intelligence picture. If the FORINT is timely, analysed correctly and contextualised by proactively linking activities, persons and intelligence objectives will provide an 'understanding of crime systems and mechanisms. This knowledge, in turn, allows the design of proactive actions aimed at disrupting those activities. From investigating the past, FORINT turns to anticipate the future' (Ribaux & Caneppele, 2018).

In an ideal world, linking and analysing all intelligence sources would be relatively effortless, however the policing world is far from ideal in this regard. Even before considering sensitive major crime and terrorism incidents, the policing intelligence community is besieged with barriers and cultural challenges. There have been numerous challenges that have smothered what should have been a positive addition to policing, we could argue that these challenges are entrenched in policing culture.

In a local, national and international context, as a unique product of harvesting forensic material, criminalistic FORINT has supported criminal intelligence and prosecutions since the development of theories and research by ‘pioneers such as Gross, Reiss and Locard’ (Roux et al., 2007). Though much interest and ‘lip service’ has been paid to the use of FORINT,U.K. policing has still not realised the intelligence value as a pre-emptive intervention, ‘when this potential is fully realised, the value of trace evidence will also be upgraded because it can be seen as a crucial source of information in an investigative or intelligence framework’ (Roux et al., 2007). There are examples of effective, proactive FORINT used by the Israel Police Division of Identification and Forensic Science (DIFS) in the mid-1990s. The Palestinian Authorities had legally acquired twelve thousand guns which were to be used by law enforcement agencies within their territories. Before the weapons were released, DIFS took the decision to proactively forensically ‘fingerprint’ each weapon by test-firing which would allow the identification of a weapon should it be fired in the future. A little over one month later, ‘an Israeli civilian was murdered in Jerusalem. Laboratory examination showed, beyond a doubt, that the murder weapon, an AK-47, was one of the weapons given over to the [Palestinian] Authority’ (Almog, 2014, p. 325).

Need to Know - Isolationism

To help capitalise on intelligence, there is a need to collect, collate and analyse intelligence, those involved in the intelligence process must realise what the desired outcomes of that intelligence are: to provide proactive interventions, detect activity, behaviour and actors involved, or likely to be involved, in criminal deeds. Regrettably, the intelligence community in the U.K. exhibits a culture of protectionism, ‘need to know’ and ‘dare to share’ where specialists, and those with expert knowledge are not consulted concerning intelligence which may appear ambiguous or nonsensical to the analyst.

This ‘protectionism’ of intelligence runs deep and obscures information from those who could assist if allowed access. The culture is born out in the belief that all intelligence is sensitive, especially in these days of data protection, where ‘intelligence ‘practitioners are all too aware of the need to keep some techniques secret, or at least the methodology used in those techniques’ (Buckley, 2014). The analysts have become the gatekeepers who preside over the who, what, where, when, why and how intelligence is disseminated. Alarmingly in research by James, Pythian, Wadie and Richards (2017) identified this culture to be widespread in the policing intelligence community, where ‘the attraction of strict adherence to need to know in a professional environment may be obvious, but we argue that in that paradigm, expert knowledge inevitably is bounded and opportunities for interaction and partnership are limited.’ The ‘need to know’ concept is symptomatic of broader isolationism within the intelligence community, which limits the reach of intelligence outside of the ‘need to know' clique. The ‘need to know' principle, may, of course, be the least risky option for inexperienced or unskilled intelligence staff, but ‘failing to share can carry just as many risks’ (James et al., 2017). This one-way system where intelligence is rarely shared presents a severe obstacle to constructive partnerships and opens up the potential for serious intelligence failures.

Operational, Tactical and Strategic Intelligence

We must recognise that criminal intelligence is multifaceted and must therefore have clear and comprehensive aims which can be understood by those involved in the process. Misunderstanding the aims could result in confusion and misdirection and misuse of intelligence. The intelligence community suffer the same definition issues as those involved in counterterrorism where there are numerous definitions and interpretations of the intelligence function. Fields (2009) suggests that within the U.K., agencies that deal with security and intelligence translate the requirement's match their requirements which propagate 'dislocated' intelligence microclimates. More disturbing is Fields (2009) suggests this ‘dislocation’ translates to the obscurity of aims, confusing requirements and ineffective collaboration between local and national stakeholders.

The U.K. policing, and the security apparatus that surround it, generally categories intelligence, and other policing matters, into three classifications, ‘Operational, Tactical and Strategic’ (National Crime Agency, 2019). These classifications intend to assist those involved in the intelligence process to support decision making processes by supplying intelligence appropriate to the problem. The terminology used in these classifications was appropriated from other none policing agencies, namely the ‘benefits agency, her Majesty’s immigration service, and a financial services authority’ (Sheptycki, 2016), which have different aims and goals to policing. Sheptycki (2016) suggests that these categories caused, and arguably still do, confusion amongst policing resources. Sheptycki further conceded it was challenging to identify intelligence analysts, let alone police officers, who could correctly categorise crime intelligence, let alone situate the intelligence scheme and identified problems accurately.

The issues of identifying appropriate intelligence categories if further compounded at the source and outcome stage, as the intelligence travels from sources thorough the process to actionable intelligence. Bruenisholz, Prakash and Ross (2015) suggest that the categories should not be insulated from one another; they should be viewed as elastic and adaptable with no barriers to get the most favourable outcomes. Sheptyck (2016) suggests a major issue concerns an officer’s role, role responsibilities and hierarchical nature of the police service. The argument is that senior officers, middle management, police officers have different role definitions for operational, tactical and strategic where a senior officer could view a piece of intelligence as tactical, the middle management as strategic and the officers enacting the intelligence, as operation. The policing apparatus must therefore concede the presence of differences in understanding as James (2011) warned; categorising intelligence is problematic but policing must recognise the importance of the ‘interdependencies and overlapping connections’ which exist between the categories.

Raymond & Julian (2015) observe that the U.K. police are primarily a reactive force, incident driven and prone to assume innovations that require a minimal change from their standard operating processes and working culture. For change to take effect and be possible it requires the buy-in of those involved in the process, especially policing managers who were identified as critical in change management; without their direction and understanding of the challenges and possibilities little is likely to change. ILP, and FORINT, go against this traditional policing culture. Raymond and Julian (2015) considered the overwhelming barriers to be ‘cultural, structural and administrative, as well as arising from poor communication and inadequate training.'

Forensic Intelligence: Breaking Down the Barriers

In these times of austerity, and lately the CORONA-19 pandemic, limited resources have affected many policing departments. ILP could be in its element as it has the potential to achieve proactive, timely interventions to prevent crime, preserve finances and negate future investigations of prolific offenders at low cost. If patterns are identified to assess an individual's criminal behaviours, the police can, in theory, anticipate their criminal activities. Ribaux and Caneppele (2018) suggest that criminalistic FORINT can assist with developing 'preventive’ and ‘repressive measures’ which can ‘mitigate an activity causing harm.’

Legrand & Vogel (2014) realising the importance of forensic and crime intelligence commented, though notions of 'intelligence' and 'forensics' are distinct in their own right, the concept of 'forensic intelligence' is one that remains ambiguous and detached from ILP. Those generating FORINT must acknowledge the lack of clarity and appreciate that crime intelligence is developed from numerous sources and that the ‘contributions and limitations of forensic intelligence need to be considered in the development of an integrated forensic intelligence model' (Raymond & Julian, 2015, p. 375).

In research by Tilly & French (2018, p. 150) regarding use of criminalistic forensics within the police, they discovered that this type of evidence has been underused by policing resources for many years. The main factors were described as: ‘limited forensic knowledge and training among investigators, poor communications, poor use of resources, and poor timeliness.’ These issues were not limited to the police officers themselves but included the specialist forensic resources and scientists who were identified as lacking knowledge of the crime intelligence requirements and processes; ‘forensic Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) certainly consider the intellectual process of analysis itself within their chosen field, but rarely to intelligence analysis management, which, in turn, is only a subcomponent of [the] intelligence cycle management. The process of using multiple data points to objectively predict past or future events is rarely undertaken in the forensic sciences. Consequently, input into crime prevention strategies is minimal' (Raymond & Julian, 2015, p. 376). This situation is partly a result of ignorance, ‘dare to share’ and silo culture of many law enforcement departments. There is a willingness amongst forensic resources to play a more active role in ILP and Crispino, Rossy, Ribaux, & Roux (2014, p. 1) found; ‘forensic intelligence embodies a real and new willingness of forensic practitioners to be involved in investigative and policing strategies’ by breaking down the silo walls and sharing FORINT.

If, as Weston (2015) suggests, sources of Intelligence must encompass the many sources that supply intelligence as this ultimately directs ILP why does FORINT point to the reactive. The answer may be within the policing culture. It remains unclear why developments in selective FORINT education, much limited to forensic resources, has been slow to develop in the U.K. when criminalist forensics plays an essential role in general policing. As long ago as 1909, Crispino, Rossy, Ribaux, & Roux (2014) draw attention to the Swiss, who realised the importance of FORINT, implementing an academic forensic program that was taught to police officers so they would be more scientifically aware. Unfortunately, in 2017, the Transforming Forensics Project (Home Office, 2017) was sponsored by the U.K. Home office to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of policing forensics decided to disregard ‘intelligence’ and ‘communications intelligence’ from their tranche of work. If this short-sighted stance is maintained, criminalistics and FORINT without research and government buy-in, will continue to be abused and not ‘used appropriately to structure and evaluate the use of forensic case data at all stages of the process’ (Robertson, 2015). Nevertheless, another opportunity was missed to develop and exploit FORINT.

Discussion

ILP has been studied to a limited degree, but challenges such as the sensitive nature of information restrict researchers access into their strategy, policy and data; the culture, and ‘need to know’ mentality dominates. One successful academic in the area of ILP, Adrian James, an ex-police officer and intelligence specialist, draws on his direct experience to aid his research.

The subject of FORINT within a volume crime setting has little published research and a gap in academic papers or books to draw on. When touching on the area of FORINT and terrorism, which this research ultimately wishes to address, only one relevant article of research was found, McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak (2007), which discussed ILP and Terrorism. Many of the other articles and papers have been written by those who have limited operational experience, with some exceptions, namely James.

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